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ARTICLES
THE IRRELEVANCE OF STATE CORPORATE LAW IN
THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
J. Robert Brown, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the new millennium, corporate America
found itself mired in scandal. Although the nature of the scandals
varied, self-dealing by management was the common denomina-
tor.1 Managers of public companies obtained lucrative salaries,
substantial numbers of stock options, rich severance packages,
and loans on favorable terms.2 Companies engaged in aggressive
accounting treatment at the same time insiders sold shares.'
The scandals arose in large part out of a failure of managerial
oversight. Officers and directors did not adequately protect the
interests of the corporation. Not so much a matter of director in-
dolence, the lack of oversight occurred in large part because state
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comments: Eli Wald and Celia Taylor, University of Denver College of Law; Lawrence
Hamermesh, Widener University School of Law; John Beckerman, Rutgers School of Law
(Camden); and Allison Herren, Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Denver. The willingness of
these individuals to review and comment on this article does not signify agreement with
its thesis or resulting recommendations.
1. See infra note 251.
2. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
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laws did not impose meaningful obligations on the board of direc-
tors in supervising the activities of the company.4
This was not the first time states abdicated their role in the
regulation of the corporate governance process of public compa-
nies. Congressional hearings in the 1930s revealed widespread
abuse by officers and directors of the proxy and financial disclo-
sure process.5 Congress responded with the adoption of the fed-
eral securities laws, removing from states the primary authority
to regulate shareholder voting and the corporate disclosure proc-
ess, at least with respect to public companies.6
Enactment of the securities laws did not, however, entirely
oust states from the corporate governance process. States re-
tained the authority to determine the duties and obligations of di-
rectors in the management of the company through the estab-
lishment of fiduciary obligations.7 These obligations imposed on
directors a duty to act with care, loyalty, and good faith.'
Over time, state courts interpreted the duties in a manner that
left little substance. The business judgment rule and universal
adoption of waiver of liability provisions all but eliminated causes
4. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. It is not quite accurate to say that
the securities laws regulate the corporate disclosure process only for public companies.
This is certainly true with respect to required SEC filings, which apply only to companies
subject to sections 12(g) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78 (2000)). See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000). the securities laws also regulate corporate disclo-
sure through the antifraud provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2000); see also J. ROBERT BROWN,
JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 2.01, at 2-5 to 2-6 (3d ed. 2003) [here-
inafter REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE]. The most significant antifraud provi-
sion, Rule 10b-5, applies both to public and private companies. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2003).
7. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (describing the fiduciary
duty of a Delaware director); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (dis-
cussing the definition of the duty of loyalty). The Supreme Court of Delaware has provided
little content to an independent duty of good faith. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 10; Cede, 634
A.2d at 361. Moreover, the lower courts have largely ignored it, treating it as a subcate-
gory of loyalty. See In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41
(Del. Ch. 2000) ("Within which traditional duty [of loyalty] would logically rest the sub-
sidiary requirement to act in good, rather than bad, faith toward the company and its
stockholders."). More recently, the Delaware Court of Chancery has equated good faith
with intentional disregard of known risks. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825
A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that directors' "conscious[] and intentional[]" failure
to inform themselves when making a decision breaches their duty of care).
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of action for breach of the duty of care.9 The duty of loyalty, par-
ticularly self-dealing by officers and directors, could be validated
through procedural mechanisms. With proper procedures, the
fairness of the transaction was not subject to judicial review.1 °
This approach allowed self-dealing by officers and directors al-
most without limits.1
With no serious state-imposed restrictions on self-dealing, the
consequences were inevitable. Management took advantage of the
circumstances to promote their own interests, culminating in the
recent wave of much publicized abuses. 2 Congress responded to
these circumstances with the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
("Sarbanes-Oxley")," the most far ranging securities law since the
1930s.
Sarbanes-Oxley contains a hodgepodge of provisions, ranging
from heightened regulation of accountants 4 to increased criminal
penalties for corporate malfeasance. 5 The legislation also im-
poses new responsibilities on officers and directors. 6 In many re-
spects, Sarbanes-Oxley supplants state law in the regulation of
the behavior of management, removing the last significant area of
state regulation of the governance of public companies.
Sarbanes-Oxley in some ways resolves a debate that has raged
within academic circles for the last thirty years. With states often
9. See infra notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text. The only remaining ground for as-
sessing the substance of the transactions is under a standard of waste, something difficult
to prove. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. Thus, the application of the business
judgment rule largely ended the legal analysis. See Rosser v. New Valley Corp., No. 17272,
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115, at *23 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2000) ("So while fully informed share-
holder ratification may not be tantamount to the death penalty for breach of fiduciary
duty claims, application of the business judgment rule will lead to the same end result in
virtually every case.").
12. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder Rati-
fication and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 641-42 (2002)
[hereinafter Shareholder Ratification] (discussing recent notable controversies).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-
Oxley].
14. See id. §§ 101-09, 116 Stat. 750-71 (establishing a public company accounting
oversight board).
15. See id. §§ 901-06, 116 Stat. 804-06 (enhancing white-collar crime penalties).
16. See id. §§ 301-08, 116 Stat. 775-85 (regulating corporate responsibility).
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described as competing for charters,17 considerable disagreement
has arisen over whether the competition has generated a "race to
the bottom" or a "race to the top.""8 The answer from Congress
was a race to the bottom. 9 Sarbanes-Oxley arose out of this fail-
ure to impose meaningful standards in the area of corporate gov-
ernance, resulting in the solution largely proposed by Professor
William L. Cary in 197420 and sharply criticized by most commen-
tators thereafter.2 '
Having said that, Sarbanes-Oxley did not complete this proc-
ess. Congress adopted Sarbanes-Oxley as a reaction to specific
problems arising out of the corporate governance scandals, not as
a mechanism to fill systematically the gaps created by the lack of
meaningful standards at the state level. In some cases, the provi-
sions of Sarbanes-Oxley are overly strict by, for example, prohib-
iting loans to executive management.22 In other cases, Sarbanes-
Oxley is lax, imposing governance standards that do not address
the most significant problem areas.23
The absence of systematic federal regulation of the corporate
governance process largely left to states the responsibility for de-
termining the duties and obligations of officers and directors. Be-
cause Sarbanes-Oxley does not alter the competition for char-
ters-something perhaps more accurately described as a
competition to retain charters-meaningful standards are not
likely to emerge. As a result, neither the states nor the federal
government adequately regulates the behavior of officers and di-
17. The idea that there is competition among states to attract new charters may be
wrong. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 648-85 (2002) (noting that no state seems to compete directly
with Delaware for the charters of public companies). There does appear, however, to be a
rigorous effort to retain existing charters, something that may have the same effect as a
competition. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
18. For an overview of the debate, see infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Professor Cary called for the adoption of legislation
that would, among other things, provide for uniform federal fiduciary duty standards for
public companies. Id. at 696-703. To the extent he suggested other uniform federal stan-
dards, however, his conclusions are less certain. See infra notes 62-106 and accompanying
text; see also infra notes 392-95 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 35, 37, and 40-45.
22. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 402, 116 Stat. 745, 787 (2002)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(2003)) (prohibiting loans to executive man-
agement).
23. See infra notes 371-79 and accompanying text.
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rectors. Said another way, the dynamics that resulted in the
scandals of the new millennium largely remain in place.
This article will focus on four aspects of the law of corporate
governance. Part II will examine the process of competition
among states for charters. 24 Recent commentary in the area sug-
gests that the process is driven less by a competition for charters
and more by a desire to retain existing incorporations. Part III
analyzes the history of federal intervention when states failed to
adequately regulate aspects of corporate governance, including
proxy solicitations and financial disclosure.
Part IV will discuss the unsuccessful efforts by the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to compensate for the failings
of state laws in the corporate governance area.26 Without sub-
stantive regulatory authority, the SEC tried to the use of disclo-
sure requirements to improve the degree of deliberation and gov-
ernance at the board level.27 The approach did not work, and in
some areas, such as compensation, may have been counterproduc-
tive.
Part V will examine the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and will discuss
the standards imposed on management of public companies. 2' Fi-
nally, this piece will assess the changes brought about by Sar-
banes-Oxley and make the case for the need for increased, mean-
ingful regulation of corporate governance standards for public
companies at the federal level. In many respects, Sarbanes-Oxley
supplanted state law in the regulation of the duties and responsi-
bilities of managers.
II. CORPORATE LAW AND THE "COMPETITION" FOR CHARTERS
A. Overview
Under the internal affairs doctrine, the standard of behavior
for officers and directors is traditionally determined by the law of
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra notes 187-99 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part V.B.
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the state of incorporation.29 Companies may incorporate in any
state. There need not be a meaningful nexus of any kind with the
selected jurisdiction." The state of incorporation, therefore, regu-
lates the internal affairs of a public company even if it has no
headquarters, shareholders, managers, or business operations
within the state. 31
Management determines the state of incorporation 32 and has
an incentive to incorporate in a state that most meets its objec-
tives.3 To the extent a state does not meet those objectives, the
29. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) ("The internal affairs doctrine is
a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority
to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or
between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders-because
otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands."). Nonetheless, some
states, particularly California, have in fact regulated the internal affairs of companies not
incorporated in the state. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 728
(1961) (holding that California's cumulative voting provision applied to a foreign corpora-
tion operating within that state). Even California has, however, left fiduciary duties un-
touched-that area remains the exclusive purview of the state of incorporation. See Davis
& Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1527 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Claims involving internal
affairs of corporations, such as the breach of fiduciary duties, are subject to the laws of the
state of incorporation.").
30. David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 517 (1994) (noting that a corporation "ordinarily can in-
corporate wherever it chooses").
31. See Alfred F. Conard, An Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH. L. REV.
621, 633 (1973) ("What is unusual about the race of laxity in corporation codes is that its
effect will be felt almost entirely outside the state."); see also Skeel, supra note 30, at 517;
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252 (1977).
32. Winter, supra note 31, at 252. To the extent management decides to change states
through reincorporation, shareholder approval is also required. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1437, 1458 (1992) ("Reincorporation generally requires a decision
by the company's board and approval by the company's shareholders.").
33. See Skeel, supra note 30, at 517 ("[C]orporations have an incentive ... to shop for
the state with the most attractive laws."). In the 1970s, a debate existed over the impact of
competition among states for corporate charters. Professor Cary argued that it would lead
to laws that were lax and did not adequately protect shareholders. Cary, supra note 20, at
665, 668. He used the phenomena to argue for federal incorporation. Id. at 697. Professor
Winter in turn contended that the plethora of state laws would lead to competition and
laws that better protected shareholders. Winter, supra note 31, at 256 (stating that com-
petition would "optimize the shareholder-corporation relationship."). By the 1980s, one
prominent commentator concluded that Cary's analysis had been entirely discredited. See
Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 127-28 (1987) ("In connection with this proposal for federal char-
tering of corporations, the 'race to the bottom' thesis has been vigorously analyzed and dis-
credited on both a theoretical and an empirical level.").
[Vol. 38:317
GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
company can reincorporate into a jurisdiction that does.34 At the
same time, states have an incentive to implement an approach to
regulation favored by management. Companies pay a franchise
tax to the state of incorporation.35 Delaware, one of only five
states without a sales tax,36 obtains considerable tax revenues
from companies incorporating within the state.37 This is true even
though most of them have no significant operations within Dela-
ware.
38
As long as one state puts in place a scheme of regulation fa-
vored by management, others have an incentive to do the same.
Either they wish to engage in the competition for additional com-
panies (and additional franchise taxes) or they wish to keep what
they have. In states that do not follow suit, at least some compa-
nies will have an incentive to leave the jurisdiction and re-
incorporate in a more favorable locale.39
34. This is usually done through a merger. See David L. Ratner & Donald E.
Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substantive Law of Corporations, 45
BROOK. L. REV. 641, 642 n.9 (1979) ("The normal technique for changing the state of incor-
poration is to establish a new corporation under the laws of the desired state and merge
the existing corporation into it."). As a result, reincorporation requires shareholder ap-
proval. See Bebchuk, supra note 32, at 1458.
35. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor
Cary's Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 507 (2000) (noting that in 1998 Delaware col-
lected almost $400 million in franchise taxes and "clearly has an economic interest in
maintaining its position as a jurisdiction of choice for incorporations").
36. Sales Tax Institute, Sales and Use Tax Rates (Nov. 1, 2003), at http://www.sales
taxinsitute.com/sales tax rates.html.
37. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opin-
ions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 149 (2002) ("Delaware earns substantial revenues from corpora-
tion franchise fees and taxes."); Lowenstein, supra note 35, at 507 ("[Flranchise fees in
Delaware can range up to $150,000 per year for a large corporation and are a significant
portion of the state's tax revenues, typically accounting for fifteen to twenty percent of
state revenues.").
38. See Christian C. Day, Corporate Governance, Conrail, and the Market: Getting on
the Right Track!, 26 J. CORP. L. 1, 37 n.231 (2000) (noting that most Delaware corpora-
tions operate in other states and have few, if any, employees in Delaware). Only two of the
Fortune 500 companies are actually headquartered in Delaware, one of which is incorpo-
rated in another state. See Fortune 5 Hundred Ranked Within States, FORTUNE, Apr. 14,
2003, at F-32 (noting that two Fortune 500 companies, Du Pont and MBNA, are headquar-
tered in Delaware); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Quarterly Report, Form 10-
Q (Aug. 12, 2003) (listing Delaware as state of incorporation and address of principle office
in Wilmington, Delaware); MBNA Corp., Current Report, Form 8-K, SEC File No. 001-
10683 (Aug. 20, 2003) (listing Maryland as the state of incorporation and Wilmington,
Delaware as principal executive offices).
39. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 277 (1985) (arguing that Delaware's advantage as a favorable loca-
2004]
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Commentators characterize this dynamic as a competition for
charters, although they vigorously disagree about the impetus for
the competition. Some see the competition as a race to the top.
40
They assert that management has an incentive to incorporate in
the jurisdiction that provides the most efficient corporate law.41
To the extent directors elevate self-interest over efficiency,42 the
market for corporate control will result in a change of manage-
ment. 3 Recognizing that the largest number of public companies
incorporate in Delaware, the "race to the top" view requires the
conclusion that the corporate law in Delaware is the most effi-
cient.44
The main problem with this approach is its excessive reliance
upon the market for corporate control to ensure efficiency. The
market for corporate control is not sufficiently robust to force
management to select states based upon economic efficiency.4"
Moreover, given the high costs of hostile takeovers, a great deal of
inefficiency must occur46 before the market will become a correct-
ing mechanism.47
tion for incorporation and reincorporation is founded not only in statutes, but also in "their
interpretation by [Delaware] courts").
40. The phenomenon of states competing for charters has been widely recognized, al-
though the impact of the competition has been in dispute. A few commentators, however,
seem to contend that, in fact, there is no competition for charters but that states still have
an incentive to act in a pro-shareholder fashion. See Loewenstein, supra note 35, at 503.
41. See Winter, supra note 31, at 289-90.
42. This is not to say that the two are always different. See infra notes 65-68.
43. If a state has an excessively anti-shareholder regime, the company will incur in-
vestor resistance and suffer higher costs of capital. This will, in turn, raise the costs of do-
ing business, rendering the company less efficient and more susceptible to a takeover. See
Winter, supra note 31.
44. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 473 (1987) (noting a number of prominent
commentators' conclusions that "Delaware corporate law rules are efficient, that is, they
systematically advance shareholder welfare").
45. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1795, 1873 (2002) ("The evidence presented in this Article suggests that, as a matter of
public policy, we cannot rely on the product market, the capital market, or the market for
corporate control to exert pressure on managers so that they migrate away from the typi-
cal antitakeover statutes.").
46. This assumes the market could even value the risk accurately. See Loewenstein,
supra note 35, at 537-38 ("[Tlhe 'Holy Grail' economic efficiency analysis assumes that
markets can accurately price the value of all terms of corporate governance, but there is
evidence that markets do not do a particularly good job of valuing even significant terms of
corporate governance.").
47. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57,
[Vol. 38:317
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Largely recognizing this, proponents increasingly rely upon
event studies and other statistical data to make the case.4 ' The
data, however, does not prove their case, as recent commentary
has shown. 9 In addition, the importance of the data seems to
break down in practice. The data suggests that, at most, re-
incorporation results in a relatively small increase in share
prices.5" There is little evidence suggesting that management is
aware of, and has actually used, the data as a basis for re-
incorporation. 1
Indeed, to the extent that the impetus for reincorporation is at-
tributed to non-managers, commentators point to lawyers.52 Ad-
vice on reincorporation as a strategy for increasing share prices
would seemingly emanate from investment bankers and other fi-
nancial advisors." Moreover, given the seeming certainty of the
data, at least for some commentators, it is hard to imagine why
all public companies do not reincorporate in Delaware.54
61-67 (1990) (discussing reasons why the market for corporate control does not correct
management inefficiency); see also Loewenstein, supra note 35, at 531 ("The otherwise in-
efficient corporate statute must have a dramatic effect on the stock price, as the typical
hostile takeover is at a premium of twenty-five to thirty-five percent over market.").
48. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 39, at 246; Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the
Corporate Law Race, 28 J. CORP. L. 143 (2002).
49. For a more detailed discussion of these studies and their weaknesses, see Lucian
Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1775, 1790-96 (2002) (discussing these studies and their weaknesses in detail). See
also Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of
Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551, 559-66 (1987)
(discussing studies regarding the effects of reincorporation).
50. The average of six studies shows an increase of around one percent, while two of
the studies actually show a negative increase. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 49, at 1792
("Thus, a 1% positive abnormal return is probably as fair a measure as any if one were in-
clined to rely on these event studies to measure the effect on stock price of reincorporation
to a superior corporate law regime.").
51. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1561 (2002) (stating that the "question of where firms incorporate and how they
choose [where to incorporate]" has not been well studied).
52. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 743 ("[Nloncompeting states respond
mostly to the lobbying efforts of local managers and lawyers."); see also Macey & Miller,
supra note 44, at 502-06; Loewenstein, supra note 35, at 503-06; William W. Bratton,
Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the Basic Course After
Twenty-five Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447, 460-61 (2000); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at
694-99.
53. See Romano, supra note 39, at 275 n.72.
54. While concluding that companies engaging in initial public offerings ("IPOs")
would only incorporate in states that provide the greatest IPO price, Engledow does not
explain why, given event study data suggesting that Delaware had the most "efficient"
state law, all companies do not incorporate there before conducting an IPO. See Engledow,
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Others see the motivation for selecting the state of incorpora-
tion as more self-serving, characterizing the competition as a race
to the bottom.55 Management will select a jurisdiction that favors
its own self-interest.56 Among other things, the goal is to select
the state of incorporation that permits management to extract the
most benefit for itself, without regard to efficiency or the interests
of shareholders.57
This approach also has problems. First, changes in state corpo-
rate codes often cannot be characterized as being for or against
the interests of management." Second, even if management op-
poses the changes, the harm must outweigh the costs (financial
and reputational) before reincorporation will occur.59 Third, man-
agement self-interest and efficiency are not always antithetical
notions.6 °
supra note 48, at 149-61.
55. See generally Cary, supra note 20. In addition to Cary and the commentators cited
in his article, see also Bebchuk, supra note 32, at 1444-45 (discussing Cary's race to the
bottom analysis).
56. One commentator has taken the position that Delaware in fact attracts charters
because of the "indeterminacy" of its corporate law. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competi-
tion Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998) ("Yet
state competition theories fail to explain the well-documented indeterminacy of Delaware
corporate law, which is evident in the state's ample use of vague standards that make pre-
diction of legal outcomes difficult."); see also Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Dela-
ware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1072-1100
(2000) (noting the importance of courts in making law as an explanation for Delaware's
preeminent position). Both Kamar and Fisch are correct in emphasizing the importance of
Delaware court decisions as a significant explanation for the state's preeminence in at-
tracting corporate charters. They are also correct in emphasizing that corporate laws are
largely templates, with the courts determining the outcome of each particular fact pattern.
To the extent that they conclude that Delaware decisions are indeterminate, they are not
correct. In fact, the strength of the Delaware courts is the ability to apply broad doctrines
to varied fact patterns and consistently rule in a manner that favors management. See in-
fra notes 133-86 and accompanying text.
57. For a recent article that provides an empirical basis for this conclusion, see
Subramanian, supra note 45, at 1872.
58. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 701-07.
59. Reincorporation is not a cost free process, although the significance of the expense
has been a subject of debate. Compare Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Po-
litical and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 585-89 (1990) (arguing that the
costs of reincorporation are not significant), with Romano, supra note 39, at 246 (asserting
that costs of reincorporation can be significant). Either way, the benefits of reincorporation
would have to outweigh the costs for management to consider reincorporation. Not all un-
favorable managerial provisions would meet this threshold requirement.
60. See Macey & Miller, supra note 44, at 470-71.
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B. Competition or No Competition?
Some commentators question whether the characterization of a
competition accurately explains the evolution of corporate law.6
Professors Kahan and Kamar, in a thoughtful piece, view the no-
tion of a competition as a myth.62 They note that only Delaware
generates significant revenues from franchise taxes and that no
other state appears to be taking the steps necessary to compete
significantly for the revenues.63 They conclude that, for reasons
unrelated to a competition for charters and a race to the bottom,
all states have a pro-management bias in the development of cor-
porate law.64 In fact, Delaware has less of a bias because, in at-
tracting reincorporations, the state has an incentive to make its
laws "more favorable to shareholders than the laws of noncompet-
ing states."65
The article is certainly correct in concluding that corporate law
in its entirety cannot be explained through reference to a compe-
tition or race. Virtual shareholder meetings,66 the insolvency test
for dividends, and the elimination of the labels of common and
preferred stock, to name a few, hardly seem to have resulted from
a competition to attract or retain corporate charters. Some of
these changes cannot be accurately characterized as pro-
management. Even if they could, they hardly seem the types of
61. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J.
ON REG. 139 (2003) (describing the interaction of states and the impact on the corporate
reform process).
62. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17 at 679.
63. Id. at 688.
64. See id. at 749. Kahan and Kamar have concluded that, even absent a "competi-
tion" for charters, a pro-management bias exists in the corporate reform process. See id.
("[B]oth Delaware and noncompeting states, albeit for different reasons, skew their laws in
favor of managers."). In fact, they propose that "[tihe laws of noncompeting states there-
fore tend to be more favorable to managers than they would be if they competed for incor-
porations." Id. at 737.
65. Id. at 749. Reincorporation generally requires shareholder approval. See Ratner &
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 642.
66. Section 211(a)(1) of the Delaware Code now permits stockholder meetings entirely
by remote communications, without the need for physical attendance. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 211(a)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Companies may do so, however, only if they have imple-
mented measures to ensure that all stockholders have an opportunity to participate in the
meeting. Id. § 211(a)(2). Moreover, the authority to hold a meeting in cyberspace rests ex-
clusively with the board of directors. Id.
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changes that would cause companies to incur the expense of re-
incorporation.67
Having said that, Kahan and Kamar's reasoning is not com-
plete. First, while they make a strong case that states do not ac-
tually compete for additional charters, 8 they are less convincing
when they argue that states do not aggressively seek to prevent
reincorporations.69 While Delaware does generate the largest
amount of revenue from franchise taxes, this does not mean that
the payments in other jurisdictions are so insignificant that
states will stand by as companies reincorporate." The recent ef-
forts by the governor of Texas to close the "Delaware loophole" in
order to preserve franchise taxes is one example.7'
Nor are franchise taxes the only reason states seek to prevent
reincorporation. Reincorporation may result in loss of prestige
when large companies headquartered in the state move to an-
67. Professor Romano has placed the typical cost of reincorporation at $40,000, al-
though that figure was from the 1980s. Romano, supra note 39, at 246. Some commenta-
tors have argued that companies should reconsider the reliance on Delaware as a location
for incorporation. In describing the advantages of a non-Delaware jurisdiction, they
invariably make the case that the other state provides even greater managerial flexibility
and reduced liability. See, e.g., Byron F. Egan & Curtis W. Huff, Choice of State of Incorpo-
ration-Texas Versus Delaware: Is It Now Time to Rethink Traditional Notions?, 54 SMU
L. REV. 249, 251 (2001) (noting that Texas, among others, expanded indemnification provi-
sions for officers and directors, allowed liability to be removed for a violation of the law
and a breach of the duty of loyalty, and expanded the type of information directors and
officers may rely upon in performing their duties).
68. There is anecdotal evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., William Gruber, George
Ryan to Ask Local Corporations to Charter in State, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1996, § 3, at 3
(reporting that Illinois Secretary of State George Ryan encouraged companies operating in
Illinois to incorporate in the state, and noting Ryan's opinion that "Illinois corporate laws
now match the laws of Delaware-or any other state-in terms of simplicity, clarity and
the benefits for business").
69. They devote two paragraphs to the issue. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 699-
700. The desire to prevent reincorporation rather than seek additional charters can create
a race to the bottom dynamic. Changes in the law favorable to management in one state
might result in reincorporation unless duplicated in the state of incorporation. See
Bebchuk et al., supra note 49, at 1779-80 (arguing that the conclusions based on empirical
studies supporting the race to the top view are unjustified). But see Engledow, supra note
48, at 148-50 (taking the position that states are not racing to the bottom).
70. Focusing exclusively on franchise taxes may also be too narrow and not fully re-
flect the tax advantages of incorporating in Delaware. See Jay Hancock, Maryland Needs
to Close Out-of-State Tax Loophole, BALT. SUN, Feb. 5, 2003, at 1D (discussing a tax loop-
hole for companies incorporated in Delaware and doing business in other states).
71. See Monica Wolfson, Companies Can Breathe Easy Knowing They Avoided Fran-
chise Tax Again, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A6 (noting that Texas
subsidiaries reincorporated in Delaware to avoid franchise taxes and reporting that the
total state franchise tax revenues were predicted to decline by $144 million in 2003).
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other state. There may be a loss of work for local lawyers and
other professionals. Perhaps most importantly, many non-
Delaware companies have their headquarters and significant op-
erations in their respective states of incorporation. 2 Companies
reincorporating because of the perceived unfriendliness of the lo-
cal corporate law may be tempted to do more than just change the
location of legal incorporation by moving headquarters or opera-
tions, something that could result in a loss of jobs and a diminu-
tion of the tax base.
In fact, Kahan and Kamar's analysis illustrates the degree to
which states will go to retain companies within their jurisdic-
tions. As they correctly note, anti-takeover laws arose not in
Delaware but in states seeking to protect local companies. 73 In
adopting these laws, states were probably motivated less by a de-
sire to protect franchise taxes and more by a desire to avoid the
loss of prestige and the economic consequences associated with a
takeover of a local company.74
Second, the article correctly notes that a number of reforms
cannot be explained by conventional notions of competition, 75 but
then ignores reforms that can.76 Kahan and Kamar conclude "that
ogive diffusion of statutory innovations is consistent with legisla-
tive motives other than competition for incorporations."77 More-
over, they challenge the conclusion in Professor Romano's article
that the diffusion pattern for corporate law reform suggests com-
petition."
72. See Romano, supra note 39, at 278 ("It is no coincidence that in most of these
cases, statutory domicile coincides with the location of valuable physical assets, major op-
erating facilities, and/or executive offices.").
73. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 703-04.
74. The combined entity would presumably have its headquarters at the location of
the bidder. The target could also incur job reductions and plant closures in an effort to re-
duce costs, all of which could have a detrimental impact on the state of the target's incor-
poration.
75. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 701-07.
76. Others make the same mistake. See Engledow, supra note 48, at 177 (concluding
that all of the reviewed reform measures produce costs that outweigh any benefits).
77. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 716.
78. Id. at 715-16. Professor Romano studied the pattern of reform in connection with
four matters: indemnification, short-form mergers, elimination of appraisal rights for
companies whose shares trade on a national exchange, and anti-takeover statutes. Ro-
mano, supra note 39, at 233.
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In rejecting competition as an explanation for reform, Kahan
and Kamar largely rely on four changes in the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act79 and the pattern of adoption by the
states."0 These include the authorization of share exchanges, the
use of the insolvency test for dividends, the replacement of major-
ity with plurality vote requirements, and the exclusive nature of
dissenter's rights."1 The article also analyzes anti-takeover stat-
utes and concludes that their adoption cannot be explained by a
competition for charters.82
The article is almost certainly correct in rejecting competition
as an explanation for most of these reforms. Some of them are ar-
guably not pro-management. 3 Others, while arguably pro-
management, do not significantly implicate areas of substantial
managerial interest. 4
Nevertheless, the case concerning anti-takeover statutes illus-
trates the limits of their conclusion. The anti-takeover statutes
were not designed to attract additional charters, as Kahan and
Kamar acknowledge." They are designed to prevent reincorpora-
tions8 6 Delaware's relative slowness in adopting these provisions
is most likely explained not by the absence of competition but by
other factors.
Because of the number of companies incorporated in Delaware,
the state's population includes both targets and bidders, making
a consensus among public companies within the state a slower
process."s Moreover, the statutes are complex and can interfere
79. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. (2002).
80. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 702-03.
81. Id. at 702 n.70.
82. Id. at 703-04.
83. The insolvency test for dividends makes economic sense. Nonetheless, the stated
capital test probably provides management of public companies with greater flexibility to
pay dividends. For most public companies, stated capital is a negligible amount.
84. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 702 n.70 (noting that one significant
change was the authorization of share exchanges).
85. Id. at 704.
86. States adopting anti-takeover statutes were largely interested in protecting com-
panies that, while incorporated within the jurisdiction, also had operations within the
state. Id. at 704 n.77.
87. In most states, the prospect of takeovers presented the possibility of layoffs, plant
closures, and other negative economic consequences. Delaware, on the other hand, had to
consider anti-takeover legislation in the context of companies that largely had no signifi-
cant operations within the state. Moreover, Delaware also had to consider that bidders
were often as likely to be incorporated within the state as targets. It is therefore too sim-
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with traditional corporate transactions. They, for example, often
impose restrictions on the ability of large shareholders to acquire
the company. 8 In contrast, Delaware was the innovator in the
development of other, more flexible anti-takeover tactics, such as
poison pills. 9
C. Competition for Charters, Director Liability, and Job
Preservation
The conclusion that these provisions cannot be explained
through competition does not rule out the possibility of competi-
tion in other areas. Only those areas important enough to man-
agement to result in reincorporation can be explained as a prod-
uct of competition among states. Three areas seem likely to have
paramount importance to management: (1) maximizing decision-
making flexibility (particularly for self-dealing transactions); (2)
minimizing liability (particularly for breach of fiduciary duties);
and (3) job preservation.9" Moreover, even changes in these areas
will not result in reincorporation unless the costs outweigh the
benefits. Presumably only a small number of provisions will fall
into this category.91
A number of examples of this type of competition exist. In the
context of liability, Delaware amended its corporate code in 1986
to permit companies to waive monetary liability for breach of the
duty of care by directors.92 In a relatively short time, every juris-
ple to use shareholder interests as an explanation of Delaware's slower pace in adopting
these statutes or adopting less virulent forms. See supra note 38.
88. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 49, at 1814-15.
89. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
90. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 49, at 1779 ("[Sltate competition induces states to
provide rules that managers, but not necessarily shareholders, favor with respect to corpo-
rate law issues that significantly affect managers' private benefits of control, such as rules
governing takeovers."). Even in these areas of importance it would be wrong to state that
every change will cause reincorporations. Only if there were significant differences (which
could be a single significant difference or a collection of smaller differences) among the
states in these areas would management likely incur the costs associated with reincorpo-
ration. See id. at 1792-97 (analyzing the confounding events that accompany reincorpora-
tions); see also supra note 59 (discussing costs of reincorporation).
91. Alternatively, the benefits of reincorporation could outweigh the costs where a
number of less important changes, in the aggregate, resulted in a more pro-management
regulatory scheme.
92. Delaware law allowed companies to include in their charter a provision that would
waive monetary damages for breach of a director's fiduciary duties. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §102(b)(7). The provision, however, specifically prohibited waivers for breach of the
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diction followed suit.93 Given the ostensible justification for the
provision (to ensure that companies could attract qualified direc-
tors by eliminating the fear of liability), it is possible that the
other states found the analysis persuasive and acted quickly.
More likely, however, states implemented the change to forestall
the possibility that companies would reincorporate if the legisla-
ture failed to act.94
Similarly, managers have a desire to retain their jobs. They
confront the risk of losing their positions in the event of a hostile
takeover. While Delaware was slow to adopt anti-takeover stat-
utes, 95 the state did not delay when it came to authorizing defen-
sive tactics subject to the discretion of the board of directors.9 In
duty of loyalty or good faith, for intentional misconduct, and for any transaction involving
an "improper personal benefit." Id. The main impact of the provision, therefore, was to
permit waiver of monetary damages for breach of the duty of care. See Michael Bradley &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance,
75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 43 (1989) ("[Section 102(b)(7)] was enacted by the Delaware Legislature
after the Trans Union decision in response to the perceived crisis in the D&O liability in-
surance industry.").
93. By the year 2003, all fifty states had a waiver of liability or similar provision in
place. See Michael Bradley et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, nn.132-33 (1999) (listing forty-six states with
some type of waiver of liability provision). The four states missing from the list are Maine,
Missouri, Ohio, and West Virginia. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 302(11) (West Supp.
2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 355.131 (West 2001); OHIo REV. CODE ANN, § 1701.59 (D) (Anderson
2001); W. VA. CODE § 31D-2-202 (Michie 2003). Thus, all states put the provisions in place
in less than twenty years from the date of the adoption of the first by Delaware.
94. It is also of interest that, in the four changes studied by Romano, the one adopted
by the most states at one of the fastest rates concerned the elaboration of the standard for
indemnification of officers and directors. See Romano, supra note 39, at 233 fig.1. The
change essentially reduced management exposure by broadening the instances when in-
demnification would be permitted. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE
L.J. 1078, 1081 (1968) ("The statutory current [for indemnification] ... seems to have set
in the direction of greater permissiveness.").
95. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (restricting a corpora-
tion's business combinations with certain interested stockholders). See also J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Discrimination, Managerial Discretion and the Corporate Contract, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 541, 582 n.181 (1991) [hereinafter Brown, Discrimination] (referencing
Delaware's 'failure to adopt" many of the manager-friendly statutes that had been popular
in other states).
96. Some have questioned the metaphor of a competition in the context of judicial de-
cisions. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 17, at 707-08. Several things can be said about
this. First, some have suggested that judges are aware of political developments in the
corporate law area and make decisions accordingly. See John Coffee, Post-Enron Jurispru-
dence, N.Y. L.J. July 17, 2003, at 5 (2003), (noting that some recent Delaware court deci-
sions could be explained by a desire to prevent additional federal intervention in the cor-
porate governance process). Second, Cary suggested that judges in Delaware have a pro-
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this area, Delaware has again had a profound impact on other
states.97
The most effective anti-takeover tactic is a shareholder rights
plan or poison pill.9" The poison pill was invented in the 1970s
and judicially validated in the 1980s. 99 While the invention of the
poison pill may have required some creative lawyering, the device
would not work unless state corporate law agreed to permit dis-
crimination among shareholders of the same class.1 °°
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,"°' the Supreme Court of
Delaware approved for the first time discrimination among
shareholders of the same class. 0 2 Although Unocal involved a
self-tender offer, the same principal was later extended to poison
pills."0 3 In the aftermath of the decision, courts in at least three
jurisdictions found the principal of discrimination troubling and
declined to follow it."°4 The effect was to outlaw poison pills. In
each of these states, however, the legislature stepped in and over-
management bias. See Cary, supra note 20, at 670. To the extent that judges in other ju-
risdictions reject Delaware precedent, they risk legislative reversal. See infra note 188 and
accompanying text. While it is probably true, therefore, that judges do not decide cases
with a view toward competition for charters, the existence of case law favorable to man-
agement likely can influence the decision to incorporate or reincorporate. Moreover, as
discussed, there are mechanisms for ensuring that the case law in fact reflects the inter-
ests of management.
97. See generally Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 582 n.82 (citing twenty
state statutes authorizing poison pill plans).
98. See id. at 569-70, 570 n.121 (describing the development of the poison pill).
99. See id. at 571.
100. See id. (stating that "[w]ithout [discrimination], the [poison] pill would lose po-
tency and popularity").
101. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
102. Id. at 957; see also Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (up-
holding the use of poison pills).
103. See Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 571.
104. See Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., No. 86-0701, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18237, at *9-10 (D. Haw. Oct. 31, 1986) (finding that Colorado law prohibits discriminat-
ing among members of the same stockholding class); R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway, Inc., 644
F. Supp. 868, 873-74 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (finding that Wisconsin's law, like New Jersey's,
does not permit discriminating among shareholders); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL In-
dus., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that New Jersey law does not per-
mit discrimination among shareholders); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F.
Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("We believe that as a matter of New Jersey law this
type of discrimination between holders of a class of securities is illegal."). See also Gelco
Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849 (D. Minn. 1986), affd in part, and rev'd
in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Minnesota law permitted discrimi-
nation, but noting that "time pressures ... foreclosed the careful deliberation that is nec-
essary for definitive evaluation"); Asarco, Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 480 (D.N.J.
1985).
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turned the court decisions.' ° In other words, within a short time,
all jurisdictions addressing poison pills developed laws that mim-
icked Delaware's.
Delaware, therefore, took the lead in minimizing liability for
directors and maximizing job retention by validating the most
flexible and virulent defensive tactic, the poison pill. Thereafter,
states followed Delaware's lead in quick order. It is difficult to
characterize these changes as a gradual process of reform arising
out of notions of innovation and efficiency. Both matters were suf-
ficiently important to management to raise the specter of reincor-
poration, thereby causing other states to quickly implement these
changes.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM, AND A
HISTORY OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION
A. Overview
In addition to waiver of liability provisions and defensive tac-
tics, states also arguably compete in determining concerns the
duties of managers. Not all fiduciary obligations are of equal con-
cern to management. States diverge (and do not automatically fol-
low Delaware) in a number of areas, such as the corporate oppor-
tunity doctrine.'0 6 In other areas, however, states follow the
Delaware courts in minimizing the obligations of management.0 7
Delaware courts have reduced the duty of care to a series of for-
malities. In the area of conflicts of interest, courts no longer have
the right to review the fairness of the transaction, at least if
properly approved by independent directors. Finally, the courts
have not imposed meaningful obligations on directors to monitor
the activities of the company.
105. See Brown; Discrimination, supra note 95, at 582-84.
106. See infra note 189.
107. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
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B. Federal Intervention and the Evolution of Corporate
Governance
The competition for charters began in the 1880s and, at least
initially, accelerated necessary reforms of state corporate codes.
Afraid of the corporate form, states originally imposed significant
limitations on size."'8 Corporations could not own shares of an-
other, were subject to limits on duration and size, and were re-
quired to have narrow purpose clauses.0 9 Management sought
the removal of these limitations in order to permit the use of the
corporate form to aggregate capital.110 Eventually, all states re-
pealed these restrictions."'
Following the repeal of restrictions on size, those running pub-
lic corporations wanted maximum discretion to conduct business.
As a result, corporate codes were amended to shift authority from
shareholders to directors." 2 The best example was probably the
universal adoption of provisions allowing for the insertion of
blank check stock provisions in the articles of incorporation." 3 Di-
rectors received the discretion to create new classes of stock,
something that could be used both to facilitate capital raising and
stop hostile takeovers." 4
108. Id. at 545-46.
109. See Louis K Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-64 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (describing early limitations state laws imposed on corporations). Gradually, these
restraints were repealed and became a matter of board discretion. Blank check preferred
stock provisions allowed management to issue new classes of shares without shareholder
approval. The elimination of purpose clauses enabled managers to dramatically change
the nature of the business without shareholder consent. See infra note 112 and accompa-
nying text. More recently, Delaware courts have eliminated long standing prohibitions on
discriminatory treatment of shareholders within the same class. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 956-57 (Del. 1985). Delaware courts also have eliminated the
requirement that fiduciaries not usurp a corporate opportunity without first presenting
the matter to the board of directors. See Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157
(Del. 1996).
110. Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 546-47.
111. See id. at 546-47.
112. See id. at 547. The number of matters that required shareholder approval were
reduced, nonvoting stock was permitted, cumulative voting ceased to be a requirement,
and super-voting requirements for shareholder actions were largely eliminated. See Alfred
F. Conard, An Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 623, 636-37 (1992)
(noting elimination of cumulative voting under Michigan law).
113. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2001).
114. Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 548.
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While authority shifted to the board, shareholder rights did not
receive commensurate protection. Corporate codes were not up-
dated to reflect the separation of ownership and management in
public companies. Instead, state statutes were built around the
notion that shareholders could participate in management and
also attend meetings to vote their shares. States did not regulate
the proxy process in any meaningful manner or require compa-
nies to distribute information to shareholders.'15 Instead, share-
holders were largely left with the affirmative obligation to obtain
information under their statutory right of inspection.'16
By the 1930s, it was clear that state law did not adequately
protect the rights of shareholders in the context of voting1 7 or
disclosure.' As the legislative history of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19341" ("Exchange Act") demonstrates, management used
the gaps in state regulation to its advantage. 2 ° The proxy process
and lack of disclosure facilitated self-perpetuation in office and
self-interested behavior, particularly insider trading. As the
House Report to the Exchange Act noted:
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to
every equity security bought on a public exchange. Managements of
properties owned by the investing public should not be permitted to
perpetuate themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies. Insiders
having little or no substantial interest in the properties they manage
have often retained their control without an adequate disclosure of
115. Some jurisdictions and the New York Stock Exchange did require the distribution
of an annual report. The report was not governed by common accounting standards or con-
tent regulation and represented at most a snapshot of the company's finances. See J.
Robert Brown, Jr. & Stephen M. DeTore, Rationalizing the Disclosure Process: The Sum-
mary Annual Report, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 39, 44-46 (1988-89) (discussing the devel-
opment of the annual report requirement and the early problems).
116. See Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 549.
117. See BROWN, REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 6, § 2.02[1] n.32.
In addition, states largely left the voting process unregulated. Id. Other than validating
voting by proxy, the statutes did not impose any specific disclosure requirements or oth-
erwise limit the ability of management to manipulate the voting process. Id.
118. Id. § 2.02[3]. With respect to disclosure, the majority of state statutes accepted
that shareholders needed information about the operations of the company and the deci-
sions of management. States responded to the need by adopting inspection rights statutes.
See id. § 2.01. Rather than affirmatively require companies to provide the information,
corporate codes placed the onus on shareholders. They had to provide the appropriate de-
mand, have a proper purpose, and travel to company headquarters to look at records. Id.
119. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
120. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, pt. 2, at 12 (1934) (noting that disclosure re-
quirements are necessitated in part by "a growing tendency toward extreme broadness
and flexibility in the corporation laws of many States").
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their interest and without an adequate explanation of the manage-
ment policies they intend to pursue. Insiders have at times solicited
proxies without fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for
which the proxies are to be used and have used such proxies to take
from the stockholders for their own selfish advantage valuable prop-
erty rights.
121
As a direct result of these abuses and the failure of states to
adequately regulate the voting and disclosure process, Congress
included in the Exchange Act comprehensive provisions transfer-
ring regulatory authority to the newly created Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC").22 Perhaps the broadest provision,
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, gave the SEC plenary author-
ity to regulate the proxy process.123 Similar authority appeared in
section 13(a) with respect to corporate disclosure.1 24
The adoption of the federal securities laws took away from the
states two important areas of oversight in connection with the
corporate governance process for public companies.12 Congress,
however, made no effort to directly interfere with or regulate the
duties and obligations of directors.'26 Federal law did require that
public companies disclose self-interested transactions, including
121. Id. at 13-14.
122. See Pub. L. No. 73-404, § 4, 48 Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)
(2000)). Initially, responsibility for enforcing the securities laws was given to the Federal
Trade Commission. The Exchange Act, however, created a new regulatory body, the SEC,
to handle the task. Id.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78N(a) (2000); see alsol7 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -104 (2003).
124. Pub. L. No. 73-404, § 4, 48 Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78M(a)
(2000)); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 to -17 (2003). The legislation initially applied only
to certain classes of public companies. As adopted, the proxy and disclosure provisions ex-
tended only to companies traded on a stock exchange. See Exchange Act §§ 13-14, 48 Stat.
at 894-95. In 1964, Congress amended the Exchange Act to apply these requirements to
companies with a certain number of shareholders and amount of assets. See Pub. L. No.
88-467, § 12(g), 78 Stat. 565, 566-68 (1964). For a discussion of the 1964 amendments and
their impact on the application of the proxy rules, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Share-
holder Communication Rules and the Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in
Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CoRp. L. 683, 710-14 (1988) [hereinafter Brown,
Shareholder Communication Rules].
125. The Exchange Act originally imposed the requirement on companies traded on a
national stock exchange. In 1964, Congress extended the requirements to companies in the
over-the-counter market. For a discussion of these changes, see Brown, Shareholder
Communication Rules, supra note 124, at 710-14.
126. The legislative history of the Exchange Act contained an express disavowal of any
desire to interfere in managerial responsibilities. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, pt. 2, at 10
(1934) ("The principal objection directed against the provisions for corporate reporting is
that they constitute a veiled attempt to invest a governmental commission with the power
to interfere in the management of corporations.").
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executive compensation, 12 7 and prohibited one form of self-
dealing-insider trading.12 Otherwise, the securities laws made
no concerted effort to regulate the duties and obligations of corpo-
129rate fiduciaries.
C. The Disappearance of Director Duties
The adoption of the federal securities laws stripped from states
certain responsibilities in the area of corporate governance. The
securities laws did not, however, supplant state regulation of fi-
duciary duties. The laws also did not change the dynamics of the
competition for charters or otherwise alter the preeminence of
Delaware. States still had an incentive to put in place a manage-
ment friendly approach to regulation.
In the area of corporate governance, therefore, Delaware law
continued to evolve in a direction that favored management's self-
interest. Courts replaced substantive review of board decisions
with procedural safeguards that did not adequately ensure the
protection of shareholder interests. 3 ' This was particularly true
with respect to the duty of loyalty. In addition, changes in corpo-
rate law significantly reduced the risk of monetary liability for di-
rectors, particularly for violations of the duty of care.
Under Delaware law, approval by "disinterested" and inde-
pendent directors of a self-interested transaction results in the
127. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2003) (discussing the scope of the disclosure required) for
executive compensation; 17 C.F.R.0020§ 229.404 (2003) (discussing the scope of required
disclosure for self-interested transactions).
128. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have emerged as the primary provisions used to pre-
vent insider trading. See Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000)). This, however, was a later development. Congress inserted section
16 in an effort to end the practice. See Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 16(a), 78 Stat. 565, 579 (1964)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000)). A strict liability provision, section 16 did not require
an examination of motivation or intent. Id.
129. Greater substantive regulation did occur in the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Pub. L. No. 76-768, §§ 1-53, 54 Stat. 789, 789-847 (1940). The Investment Company Act,
for example, required that at least forty percent of the directors of an investment company
be disinterested. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000) (stating that "[n]o registered investment
company shall have a board of directors [with] more than 60 per centum of the members"
who are interested parties).
130. Commentators have provided a possible explanation for this bias. See, e.g., Cary
supra note 20, at 690-701 (noting the close connection between the legislature, judiciary,
and bar in Delaware).
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application of the business judgment rule.13 1 The affect is to re-
place fairness with waste as the only substantive standard courts
can use to review the transaction. 3 2 Given the difficulty in estab-
lishing waste, the change in the standard effectively limits judi-
cial review to the procedures used by the board in making the de-
cision.133 In addition, the courts did not impose on directors
meaningful obligations to monitor the activities of the corpora-
tion. Absent a meaningful duty to monitor, directors benefitted
from remaining uniformed, and had little incentive to put in place
systems designed to funnel information to the board.
1. Duty of Care
The duty of care applies to board decisions that do not involve
conflicts of interest. Directors must discharge their duties in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."'34 Best interests will be met if the board can show "any
rational business purpose" for the action. 35
With respect to board decisions,136 courts will not consider
whether behavior violates the duty of care unless plaintiffs rebut
the presumption of the business judgment rule.' 37 The business
judgment rule protects decisions made in good faith, on a fully in-
formed basis, and in the best interests of shareholders. 38 Rebut-
ting the presumption requires a showing of gross negligence,'39 a
131. Brown, Shareholder Ratification, supra note 12, at 642.
132. Id. at 650-51.
133. Id. at 646.
134. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
135. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levine, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
136. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (noting that "the business judgment rule operates
only in the context of director action"). In at least some cases, the business judgment rule
has been found inapplicable to deliberate inaction by directors. See In re Walt Disney De-
rivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("Knowing or deliberate indifference by a
director to his or her duty [of care] ... is conduct... that may not have been taken hon-
estly and in good faith to advance the best interests of the company."); see also In re Ab-
bott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 2003).
137. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916-17 (Del. 2000). Successfully rebutting
the presumption of the business judgment rule does not result in per se liability. Id. In-
stead, the burden shifts to the directors to show the "entire fairness" of the transaction.
Id.; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
138. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
139. Id. Violations of the duty of care are "predicated upon concepts of gross negli-
gence." Id.; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (noting that deci-
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standard higher than the one supported by the language of the
corporate code.14°
In addressing the presumption, courts largely limit the analy-
sis to the process used in making the decision."' To the extent
boards follow the proper procedures, plaintiffs are reduced to
claims for waste, an extraordinarily difficult standard to meet.
142
The result of this approach is a "rubber-stamp" of director behav-
ior."4 Only one significant Supreme Court of Delaware case in the
last thirty years has resulted in the inapplicability of the business
judgment rule and the imposition of liability for breach of the
duty of care by directors of a public company. 144 In Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 45 the supreme court agreed that plaintiffs had rebutted
the business judgment rule by showing that the board was unin-
formed. 146 In what was really a duty of loyalty case,'47 the opinion
sions reached through a "grossly negligent process" will not be respected).
140. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984) (stating that directors "shall
discharge [their] duties.., with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances"). This type of language has traditionally
amounted to a negligence standard, something that has sometimes generated confusion.
See Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and the American
Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355, 1374 (1993) ("It now is
generally accepted that in a corporate context, the reasonably prudent person formulation
is not only incorrect, but dangerously misleading. More than one court has followed this
language literally to reach unintended and damaging results.").
141. Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board Action to Meet the Ever-
Decreasing Scope of Revlon Duties, 63 ALB. L. REV. 505, 508 (1999). ("Thus, at bottom, the
business judgment rule reflects little more than process inquiry.") [hereinafter Structuring
Corporate Board Action].
142. See Steiner v. Meyerson, No. C.A. No. 13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3 (July
19, 1995) (stating that claims for waste are difficult to advance); see also In re The Ltd.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *37 (Del. Ch. 2002)
("The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Company received no benefit in ex-
change from these two transactions or that these transactions, taken together, served no
corporate purpose."); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. 1999)
("The pleading burden on a plaintiff attacking a corporate transaction as wasteful is nec-
essarily higher than that of a plaintiff challenging a transaction as 'unfair' as a result of
the directors' conflicted loyalties or lack of due care."); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327,
336 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("[W]aste entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might
be willing to trade.").
143. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board Action, supra note 141, at 507.
144. See generally id.; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299-300 (1999) (stating that "the duty of care is all
but eviscerated by ... the 'business judgment rule').
145. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
146. Id. at 874. On remand, the directors were found liable for a $23 million under-
valuation. Robert H. Rosh, Note, New York's Response to the Director and Officer Liability
Crisis: A Need to Reexamine the Importance of D&O Insurance, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1305,
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did little more than require boards to paper the file and create
the appearance of deliberation.
148
Any doubt about the desire to exonerate directors from liability
under the duty of care disappeared with Delaware's introduction
in the 1980s of section 102(b)(7) to title eight of the Code of Dela-
ware.149 A direct response to Van Gorkom, 5 ° this section allows
corporations to insert into their articles a provision that waives
monetary damages for breach of the duty of care.15 The provision
has become ubiquitous. Moreover, following Delaware's lead,
most other states quickly adopted a similar provision.
15 2
As a result, directors with skilled legal representation do not
confront significant risk of liability in the context of the duty of
care. To the extent that directors follow proper procedures, par-
ticularly the requirement of an informed decision, the business
judgment rule insulates from challenge most business decisions
that cause loss to shareholders. Even in the absence of proper
procedures, the universal presence of the waiver of liability provi-
sion will prevent the imposition of monetary damages on direc-
tors. 53
1308 n.17 (1989). More recent cases have suggested that Van Gorkom may not, after all, be
an isolated event. See infra note 165. In addition, at least one recent case outside of Dela-
ware has imposed liability for breach of fiduciary obligations. See Pereira v. Cogan, 294
B.R. 449, 519 n.69 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
147. The facts in the case make clear that Van Gorkom wanted to sell his shares. Van
Gorkom was both the chairperson and the CEO of the company. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
864-65. The case does not address whether the board could have approved the merger out
of deference to Van Gorkom. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Corporate Law as a
Facilitator of Self Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 529, 538-39 (2000) (noting that Van Gorkom
case could be approached as "suspected self-dealing").
148. See R. Franklin Balotti et al., Equity Ownership and the Duty of Care: Conver-
gence, Revolution, or Evolution?, 55 Bus. LAW. 661, 663 (2000) (describing Van Gorkom as
emphasizing the "procedural rituals that a board should follow in making a decision").
149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1988).
150. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 1995) (stat-
ing that "[t]he statute was, in fact, a legislative response to Supreme Courts of Delaware's
liability holding in Van Gorkom").
151. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1988); see, e.g., Egan & Huff, supra note 67, at
272-73 (discussing Texas' statutory limitation on director liability).
152. Within twenty years, all fifty states had some type of provision that limited direc-
tor liability. See Bishop, supra note 93, at 1079-81.
153. One interesting development concerns the chancery court's decision in In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). In that decision, the court con-
cluded that the business judgment rule (and the waiver of liability provision) did not apply
upon a finding of bad faith. Bad faith occurred where the board acted with intentional dis-
regard of its duties. Id. at 289. At least in cases where directors are aware of facts suggest-
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2. Duty of Loyalty
Duty of loyalty cases generally involve a conflict of interest.
154
The existence of a conflict raises the possibility that the fiduciar-
ies are acting in a self-interested fashion engaging in self-dealing
at the expense of shareholders.155 The transactions were origi-
nally considered voidable.'56 Eventually, they were permitted, but
the fiduciaries retained the burden of showing the fairness of the
transaction.1
5 7
Court decisions, however, sharply restricted the reach of the
duty of loyalty, minimizing its use as a mechanism to impose
standards of behavior on directors. 158 Procedural mechanisms
largely eliminated any analysis of the fairness of the transac-
tion. 5 9 Disinterested and independent approval by informed di-
rectors or shareholders resulted in the application of the business
judgment rule, reducing a plaintiffs claim to one for corporate
waste.160 Courts could not examine the fairness of the transaction
no matter how compelling the facts.'61
ing the need for intervention or other involvement and do nothing, the resulting harm may
be viewed as a breach of the board's fiduciary obligations of good faith. See id. at 290.
154. See Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 641.
155. Id. at 647.
156. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-04 (Del. 1987).
157. See Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 652.
158. See id. at 643.
159. See id. at 642; see also Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the
Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J.
163, 240-47 (1997) (noting the growing impotence of the duty of loyalty and the ability to
protect almost any transaction through the use of procedural mechanisms).
160. See Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 650-52 (discussing the applicability
of the business judgment rule to transactions approved by disinterested directors or share-
holders); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993)
(defining the business judgment rule and explaining its application). For discussions of
how the business judgment rule limits plaintiffs' claims to those involving corporate
waste, see Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("In all events, informed,
uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate direc-
tors have a material conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from
judicial review except on the basis of waste.") and Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405
n.3 (Del. 1987) ("On the other hand, approval by fully-informed disinterested... stock-
holders... permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to
issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction.");
see also supra note 142.
161. The exception is in the case of self-interested transactions between the company
and a majority shareholder. In those circumstances, the burden simply shifts to the plain-
tiff to show the unfairness of the transaction. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422,
429 (Del. 1997) (explaining that the burden of proving unfairness shifts to the plaintiff in a
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Applying the business judgment rule seemed to presuppose
that the procedures had effectively expunged the conflict of inter-
est from the approval process.162 In fact, this was not the case.
"Disinterested" approval notwithstanding, interested directors'
influence invariably remained in the decision-making process. 16 3
Delaware courts made no effort to ensure that interested ap-
proval meant a complete absence of disinterested influence."
Delaware courts also did not ensure that participation in the ap-
proval process was limited to truly disinterested and independent
directors.'65
3. Duty to Monitor
The lack of meaningful standards of behavior can also be seen
in connection with the failure to impose an effective duty to moni-
transaction involving controlling shareholders that is approved by an independent and
disinterested board committee); see also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937
(Del. 1985). In addition, a recent Supreme Court of Delaware case suggests that courts
may be less likely to automatically dismiss cases alleging that the approval process ren-
dered the self-interested transaction subject to the business judgment rule. See Krasner v.
Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 284-85 (Del. 2003) (emphasizing that directors bear the burden of
proving that the transaction was approved by a committee of disinterested directors so
that the business judgment rule should apply).
162. See Brown, Discrimination, supra note 95, at 642.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Two Delaware Court of Chancery opinions suggest a possible shift in this area,
with the opinions imposing a more rigorous definition of "independent." See In re Oracle
Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942, 945 (Del. Ch. 2003) (concluding that two direc-
tors on the special litigation committee were not independent because, among other
things, the directors and defendants had ties with the same university); Biondi v. Scrushy,
820 A.2d 1148, 1166 (Del. Ch. 2003) (refusing to stay discovery during an investigation of
a special litigation committee where the chairperson of the committee made public state-
ments indicating that a report written by a law firm investigating allegations had vindi-
cated the defendant CEO). Of the two opinions, Oracle is the more interesting and has
broader potential impact. The decision suggests that relationships outside the corporation
can result in a loss of independence. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 945. The case seems to conflict
with the reasoning in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998),
rev'd on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), particularly the por-
tions of which suggest that outside business and personal relationships are not enough to
render a director interested. Id. at 355-56 (discussing the relationship between Eisner and
Ovitz). On this particular issue, the Supreme Court of Delaware in Brehm affirmed the
Delaware chancery court's Disney analysis. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 274. Oracle could also call
into question the language in Disney suggesting that directors who work for non-profit or-
ganizations are only interested if they obtain some type of direct benefit from the relation-
ship. Disney, 731 A.2d at 359 (discussing the case of Father O'Donovan, President of
Georgetown University).
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tor. The duty of care and loyalty applied to any action (or deliber-
ate inaction) by the board.166 The board was not held accountable
for the failure to act when it had no knowledge of the matter that
caused the harm.'67 This approach provided directors with an in-
centive to remain uninformed. As a result, directors had little in-
terest in putting in place procedures designed to ensure that they
became aware of problems within the company.
Delaware courts encouraged the practice, refusing to impose on
directors a duty to monitor. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co.,168 a 1963 Supreme Court of Delaware decision, was
widely interpreted to mean that directors had no obligation to in-
vestigate or otherwise create procedures to alert it to problems
without some type of notice or red flag.'69 As the court reasoned:
"absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to
install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists." 7 °
In the absence of procedures designed to funnel information to
the board, directors had limited information about the operations
of the company. Presumably directors reviewed some SEC fil-
ings,' and received any information provided by the chief execu-
tive officer ("CEO"). The CEO, however, had little incentive to
give directors information that would encourage active oversight
or otherwise call into question the wisdom of his or her decision.
Disputes with outside auditors, for example, were often resolved
at the officer level, without board involvement. Similarly, direc-
tors had little incentive to routinely seek other sources of infor-
mation, which could increase their oversight obligations and legal
exposure.
Events, however, outpaced the Delaware courts. Prophylactic
measures designed to ensure legal compliance became a factor in
mitigation whenever violations actually occurred. This was true
166. But see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(declaring that the business judgment rule is inapplicable where directors "consciously
and intentionally disregard their responsibilities").
167. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 131 (Del. 1963).
168. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
169. Id. at 130.
170. Id.
171. Directors must sign the annual report on Form 10-K. In general, those who sign
filings are charged with some level of knowledge of the contents. See infra notes 315 &
317.
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under the sentencing guidelines and the securities laws, among
others. As a result, while Delaware courts continued to avoid im-
posing a duty to establish procedures as part of the fiduciary obli-
gations of directors, companies were doing it anyway.
Delaware only began to take notice of these changed circum-
stances in 1996 when the court of chancery issued its opinion in
In re Caremark.72 The case suggested that directors had a fiduci-
ary obligation to monitor and to put in place procedures designed
to keep themselves informed about the activities of the com-
pany.'73 The decision specifically questioned the interpretation of
Graham that suggested directors had no duty to monitor absent
"cause for suspicion."17 4
In many ways, however, the Caremark decision was not par-
ticularly remarkable or useful in imposing meaningful standards
of behavior on directors.'75 First, it largely required what had al-
ready become common practice. Second, the decision came from
the Delaware Court of Chancery. Neither the Caremark decision
nor its rationale ever received approval by the Supreme Court of
Delaware.'76 Indeed, in the aftermath of the decision, Delaware
opinions have not made extensive use of Caremark.'77
Third, the standard employed by Caremark meant that direc-
tors would almost never be liable for a failure to monitor as a re-
sult of inadequate procedures. The court made clear that boards
would only be liable in the event of a "systematic failure" of the
172. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
173. Id. at 970.
174. See id. at 969-70 (advocating a narrower interpretation of Graham that might
impose a duty to monitor even in the absence of cause for suspicion).
175. Thus, Professor Loewenstein's argument that Caremark embodies a "high stan-
dard of fiduciary duty for Delaware directors" is not accurate. Loewenstein, supra note 35,
at 513.
176. The Supreme Court of Delaware has simply noted the existence of the claim. See
White v. Panic, 783 A-2d 543, 551-52 (Del. 2001) ("Although the derivative complaint in-
cludes allegations that seem designed to support a 'failure to supervise' claim, the plaintiff
has elected not to pursue such a claim in the Court of Chancery or in this Court.") (cita-
tions omitted). Some Delaware Court of Chancery decisions have, however, recognized the
existence of the duty to monitor. See, e.g., Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492,
505-06 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("A Caremark claim is a difficult one to prove.") (citation omitted).
177. In fairness, a number of cases outside of Delaware have cited Caremark favorably,
some interpreting Delaware law. See, e.g., Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191, 196
(4th Cir. 2001); Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Prudent lawyers
and their corporate clients have typically treated the reasoning in Caremark as controlling
law that had to be followed.
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procedures. 178 The case, therefore, seemed to require procedures
designed to keep the board informed but did nothing to ensure
that the procedures were meaningful.
The facts of Caremark established the modest nature of the
new duties. Caremark, a company with 7000 employees and
ninety branch offices, engaged in patient care. 79 Much of its
revenue came from Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. 8 0
Under the Anti-Referral Payments Law, Caremark could not pro-
vide remuneration for the referral of patients by physicians.'
The prohibition notwithstanding, Caremark sometimes executed
service or research agreements with doctors who also referred pa-
tients.8 2 As the court noted, "[sluch contracts were not prohibited
. . . but they obviously raised a possibility of unlawful 'kick-
backs.' 8 3
Ultimately, it turned out that doctors were paid for referrals."s
Caremark eventually pled guilty to a single criminal count and
paid approximately $250 million in fines and settlement
amounts. 185 Despite the obvious concern, the apparently wide-
178. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. A number of cases have noted but dismissed claims
alleging a failure to monitor. See Beam v. Stewart, No. 19844, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 98, at
*18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2003) ("Plaintiffs allegation, however, that the Board has a duty to
monitor the personal affairs of an officer or director is quite novel. That the Company is
'closely identified' with Stewart is conceded, but it does not necessarily follow that the
Board is required to monitor, much less control, the way Stewart handles her personal fi-
nancial and legal affairs."); In re Citigroup Inc. Sholders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 61, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2003) ("The complaints then allege, in wholly conclusory
terms, that all of the nineteen directors breached his or her fiduciary duties by failing to
exercise reasonable control and supervision over the 'officers, employees, and agents of
Citigroup and its subsidiaries.' In a similarly conclusory fashion, the complaints further
allege that the directors either knew about or should have known about the Enron trans-
actions and either approved of those transactions or are liable for a 'sustained and sys-
tematic failure' to supervise the activities of their corporate subordinates.") (citations
omitted); Litt v. Wycoff, No. 19083, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 23, at *41 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28,
2003) (plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient "particularized allegations" to sustain Care-
mark action that directors had failed to exercise supervision over the loan program or
compensation plan).
179. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 962.
180. Id. at 961.
181. Id. at 961-62.
182. Id. at 962.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 960, 962.
185. Id. at 960-61.
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spread nature of the practice, and the lack of supervision by the
board, the court held that no failure to monitor had occurred. '86
4. Conclusion
The duty of care has become a set of procedures, with courts no
longer required to review the substance of the transaction with
little examination of the substance of the underlying transaction.
Fairness largely ceased to be a matter for judicial review in duty
of loyalty cases. Finally, directors had little affirmative obligation
to monitor. As a result, case law evolved in a manner that im-
posed few meaningful duties on directors.
D. Application of Corporate Common Law in Other States
Delaware decisions interpreting management's fiduciary obli-
gations are widely followed by other states.17 Delaware is per-
ceived to have a deep body of case law and a high level of exper-
tise.18 In addition, a state must apply Delaware law to companies
186. Id. at 972. The company had a policy prohibiting payments for referrals. Id. at
961-62. Regional officers had to approve the contracts. Id. at 963. In general, however, the
board played little role in the oversight of the agreements. See also Pereira v. Cogan, 294
B.R. 449, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying Delaware law and finding a violation of the
Caremark standard).
187. See NCR Corp. v. AT&T, Co., 761 F. Supp. 475, 499 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("[Tlhe Court
recognizes that the decisions of Delaware courts are often persuasive in the field of corpo-
rate law."). Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of Ashland Kansas, 992 P.2d 216, 217
(Kan. 1999) ("Kansas courts have a long history... of looking to the decisions of the Dela-
ware courts involving corporation law, as the Kansas Corporation Code was modeled after
the Delaware Code.").
188. See, e.g., McMurray v. De Vink, 27 Fed. Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002) ("We share the
appellees' high regard for the courts and jurists of Delaware, and we are well aware of the
unique statute of corporate law in Delaware."); Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486,
496 (8th Cir. 2001); Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. IBP, Inc., 123
F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (D. S.D. 2000) ("Not only does Delaware law apply to this case, but
the Delaware chancery court, through its daily interpretation of that law, has earned a
reputation for its 'expertise concerning corporate governance.'"); Computer Sciences Corp.
v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21803, at *83 n.24 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
1999) ("In corporate matters where there is little or no Nevada law, Delaware law is per-
suasive."); Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 144 (Kan. 2003) ("In the past,
we have found Delaware decisions regarding corporation law persuasive, noting that the
Kansas General Corporation Code has been patterned after, and at times contains identi-
cal provisions of, the Delaware general corporation law.'") (citation omitted); Cargill, Inc.
v. Lone Star Techs., Inc., 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 106, at *7 (Minn. App. Feb. 4, 2003)
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incorporated in Delaware bringing suit within its jurisdiction. By
using Delaware law for foreign and domestic companies, courts
avoid the problem of divergent legal principles applicable to dif-
ferent companies operating within the same state.
This is not to say, however, that uniformity exists. Differences
exist in such areas as corporate opportunity"8 9 and the dismissal
of derivative suits.19 ° The differences, however, appear at best
modest and at worst non-existent. In any event, they are appar-
ently insufficient to cause companies to reincorporate in Dela-
ware. 191
As a result, most states follow Delaware and do not impose
meaningful duties on managers of public companies. 92 Moreover,
court decisions deviating from Delaware law in a way that could
("Finally, we note that Delaware 'has long been recognized as the fountainhead of Ameri-
can corporations and that its Courts of Chancery are known for their expert exposition of
corporate law.'") (quoting In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 129 F.R.D. 89, 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1990)); Woolf v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Ok. App. 1992) ("How-
ever, since the Oklahoma General Corporation Act is based on the Delaware Act, decisions
of the Delaware Courts are very persuasive.").
189. See N.E. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1148-50 (Me. 1995) (dis-
cussing various tests applied by courts when dealing with the corporate opportunity doc-
trine). Whether these legal differences are significant in actual application is an open
question. Many jurisdictions still look to Delaware law, even in this area. Id. at 1149 (de-
scribing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), as "[tihe seminal" case in applying line
of business test of corporate opportunity). See Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 122
(Conn. 1997) (describing Guth as seminal); Suburban Motors of Grafton, Inc. v. Forester,
396 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (describing Guth as the "seminal case from
which the law of corporate opportunity springs").
190. In reviewing a special litigation committee's decision to dismiss a derivative suit,
courts will examine whether the members are independent and disinterested and whether
the committee conducted a proper investigation. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 395 N.E.2d 994,
996 (N.Y. 1979). Assuming the procedural requirements are met, Delaware also allows
courts to apply their own "business judgment" in determining whether the decision to
dismiss the derivative suit was valid. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789
(Del. 1981). A number of courts, have disagreed with this approach. See Auerback, 393
N.E.2d at 1000; Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 P.2d 629, 637 (Colo. 1999) ("[Tlhe role
of a Colorado trial court in reviewing an SLC's decision regarding derivative litigation
should be limited to inquiring into the independence and good faith of the committee.").
For a discussion of the issue and citation to a number of cases on both sides of the issue,
see generally Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 132-35 (Cal. App. 2000).
While this could seem to be a significant difference, the truth is that Delaware courts have
not made significant use of the additional discretion second prong. Thus, while they leave
open the possibility that courts can apply their own business judgment, in practice they do
not.
191. See Finley, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128.
192. See notes 187-88; see also Brown, Discrimination, supra note 96, at 582.
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encourage local companies to reincorporate elsewhere are suscep-
tible to legislative reversal.193 This occurred in connection with
the handful of court opinions that declined to accept the reason-
ing in Unocal and validate the use of poison pills. 194 The same
was true with the de facto overruling of Van Gorkom through
waiver of liability provisions.195
IV. THE SEC AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
The lack of state standards regulating the behavior of directors
of public companies was not lost on the SEC. The SEC had two
distinct reasons for influencing board behavior. Foremost was the
concern over the efficacy of the disclosure regime.1 96 Greater over-
sight by the board presumably meant increased likelihood of
compliance.'97 Secondarily, the SEC understood that directors
were not adequately policing self-dealing transactions such as ex-
ecutive compensation.9 '
In trying to increase board involvement in the disclosure proc-
ess, the SEC had limited tools.'99 The agency lacked the rulemak-
ing authority to directly affect the fiduciary obligations of direc-
193. Id.
194. See supra note 105.
195. See also supra note 93.
196. For a relatively early example, see In the Matter of Occidental Petroleum Corpo-
ration, Exchange Act Rel. No. 16950 (admin. Proc July 2, 1980) (where periodic reports
were inaccurate for failing to disclose certain environmental matters, company had to
agree as part of relief to designate director who would "Recommend procedures to the full
Board of Directors to ensure that Oxy will be in a position to disclose, in accordance with
the federal securities laws on a complete, timely and accurate basis, all required informa-
tion relating to environmental matters."). See infra note 231.
197. See id. § 229.306.
198. See id. § 229.402; Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No.
33-6940, 57 Fed. Reg. 29582 (June 23, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 & 240) ("Boards
of directors are obligated, as state-law fiduciaries, to protect the interests of shareholders
through effective monitoring of senior executive performance. An important aspect of this
duty, frequently discharged by the board through a compensation committee, is determin-
ing the level and structure of compensation that is appropriate for senior executives.
Shareholders who ultimately fund executive compensation packages are entitled to know
the basis for the board's compensation decisions.").
199. See generally Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Expansion of SEC
Authority into Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119,
122-32 (1998).
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tors.200 At most, the SEC could impose disclosure requirements
that highlighted weaknesses in the procedures used by directors,
presuming that boards would make them more effective rather
than disclose the deficiencies.2"1 The SEC also used enforcement
proceedings to encourage a shift in behavior by allowing compa-
nies to use the adequacy of their procedures as a defense or at
least mitigation.2 °2
The first significant example was probably the requirement to
disclose in a current report on Form 8-K that the company had
changed independent auditors and the reasons for the change.0 3
A decision usually made by top officers, companies objecting to
accounting treatment could simply change firms and find a more
compliant auditor.2"4 Auditors not wanting to lose business had
an incentive to defer to the company's management.2 5
The SEC rules sought to minimize these effects. The agency did
so, not by transferring responsibility for replacing auditors to the
board, but by requiring companies to make public the reasons for
any change-including the basis of the disputes with manage-
ment.20 6 The approach was designed to give auditors leverage.
Companies had an incentive to resolve matters rather than risk
public disclosure of the disputes.27 The numerous amendments to
the original provision demonstrated doubts about the overall ap-
proach and the ease of circumvention.2 '
Subsequent efforts sought to use disclosure to force changes at




203. See Disclosure of Changes in Accounting Firms or in Accounting Practices, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-9344, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,363 (Oct. 5, 1971) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 249.308, 274.106).
204. See Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K, Form 8-K and Schedule 14A Re-
garding Changes in Accountants and Potential Opinion Shopping Situations, Exchange
Act Release No. 25,578, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,924 (Apr. 20,1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 12,927.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Daniel L. Goelzer, The SEC and Opinion Shopping: A Case Study in
the Changing Regulation of the Accounting Profession, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1069-74
(1987).
209. The Commission also tried to use disclosure to ensure greater compliance with
securities law provisions not directly related to corporate governance. For example, public
companies had to disclose violations of the Section 16(a) reporting requirements by execu-
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of executive compensation.21 ° In the 1990s, the agency amended
Item 402 of Regulation S-K to impose intricate and detailed rules
requiring complete disclosure of the amount paid to senior execu-
tives.211 For the first time, companies had to include a single
amount aggregating all compensation paid to the CEO and other
top officers. 2
In addition, the board had to reveal information about its de-
liberative process. First, the company had to disclose a report of
the board committee responsible for determining compensation. 3
In effect, the requirement forced boards to form compensation
committees and draft reports concerning compensation deci-
sions.214 Second, the company had to disclose a chart illustrating
the company's stock prices relative to other comparable compa-
nies.21 5 The information and the requirement of a report arguably
made it more difficult to engage in seemingly inexplicable in-
creases in executive compensation.2 6
The SEC also tried to influence (read increase) the board's role
in overseeing the company's financial disclosure. Item 306 of
Regulation S-K mandated the annual disclosure of a report by the
audit committee.2 7 The report had to reveal whether the audit
committee had reviewed and discussed the audited financial
statements with management and recommended inclusion of the
financial statements in the annual report.218 Presumably, the
tive officers and directors. See Item 10 of Form 10-K (requiring disclosure of information
described in Item 405 of Regulation S-K). See also Exchange Act Release No. 28869 (Feb.
8, 1991)(adopting release). This disclosure requirement presumably placed greater pres-
sure on the company to ensure compliance and avoid the otherwise adverse disclosure.
210. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
211. Compensation disclosure has long been required but the reforms in the early
1990s substantially increased the level of detail. See Executive Compensation Disclosure,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6962 & 34-31,327, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, 48,150 (Oct. 21,
1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 48,157.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. The SEC required companies to disclose violations by directors of their reporting
obligations under section 16 in an effort to increase compliance. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-
101, 229.405 (2003); see also Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors, and
Principal Stockholders, Exchange Act Release. Nos. 34-26,333 & 35-24,768, 53 Fed. Reg.
49,997 (Dec. 13, 1998).
217. See Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release. No. 34-42,266, 64 Fed.
Reg. 73,389 (Dec. 30, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 210, 227, 229, 240) (adopting the dis-
closure requirements).
218. See id. at 73,390.
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board of directors would ensure that these steps took place before
making the requisite disclosure.
Finally, the SEC sought to step up board oversight by making
sure that directors attended the meetings.219 The SEC, therefore,
required companies to disclose in their proxy materials the atten-
dance records of directors at meetings of the board and board
committees.22 ° Presumably, directors would rather attend meet-
ings than publicize their absences.
The SEC also used enforcement proceedings to induce compa-
nies to adopt more effective procedures designed to improve fi-
nancial disclosure.221 This occurred mostly in connection with
management's discussion and analysis ("MD&A"), the narrative
discussion required anytime companies filed financial statements
with the agency.222 With no private right of action for violations,
companies routinely ignored the requirements for the MD&A.223
To ensure greater compliance, the SEC brought a number of
enforcement proceedings against companies for deficient MD&A
disclosure.224 The decisions gradually made clear that the agency
expected companies to implement procedures designed to ensure
the efficacy of the disclosure.225 Perhaps the most unusual exam-
219. See Exchange Act Release No. 15384 (Dec. 7,1978) (adopting release) ("In light of
the importance of strong committee systems and their impact on the oversight capabilities
of the board of directors, shareholders who are being asked to make voting decisions with
respect to the election of directors, are entitled to know whether or not these important
committees exist.").
220. Committee and board attendance represents another attempt to use disclosure to
affect corporate governance. The proxy statement must include information about director
attendance at board meetings and meetings of subcommittees. Item 7(f) requires disclo-
sure of the total number of board meetings. Item 7(f) of Schedule 14A. The proxy state-
ment must also include the names of any director who failed to attend at least 75% of the
meetings of the board or any relevant subcommittee.
221. See Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About the Application of
Critical Accounting Policies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45907, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,620,
35,622 (May 20, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249) (providing an overview of
MD&A requirements and proposed changes to the disclosure procedures).
222. See id.
223. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2000); see also In re Verifone Sec.
Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993).
224. The first case ever brought for a non-fraud based MD&A violation was In re Cat-
erpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar. 31, 1992).
225. In In re Sony Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 40,305, 50 S.E.C. 724 (Aug. 5,
1998), for example, the SEC, as part of the remedy, required the company to transfer re-
sponsibility for the MD&A to the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of the company.
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ple of the use of enforcement proceedings to influence board be-
havior occurred in In re W.R. Grace & Co.
226
In that case, W.R. Grace & Co. failed to disclose in its annual
report a related party transaction and "substantial retirement
benefits" paid to a departing CEO.227 The company had in place
procedures designed to ensure accurate disclosure, including the
circulation of a questionnaire to officers and directors.22 In addi-
tion, the directors relied on counsel to ensure the sufficiency of
the disclosure.229
Despite the procedures, the SEC took the position that the di-
rectors failed to properly ensure the accuracy of the disclosure
process.23°
Serving as an officer or director of a public company is a privilege
which carries with it substantial obligations. If an officer or director
knows or should know that his or her company's statements concern-
ing particular issues are inadequate or incomplete, he or she has an
obligation to correct that failure. An officer or director may rely upon
the company's procedures for determining what disclosure is re-
quired only if he or she has a reasonable basis for believing that
those 3Vrcedures have resulted in full consideration of those is-
sues.
Unlike prior SEC actions, W.R. Grace did not involve fraud, the
traditional area of concern to the agency.2 32 Instead, the decision,
while tied to disclosure, addressed actions that more closely re-
sembled traditional oversight functions of directors. Indeed, the
226. Exchange Act Release No. 39,156 and 39,157, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.




230. Id. at 89,893.
231. Id. at 89,897. Prior cases had examined the role of management. As the SEC noted
in W.R. Grace, however, these actions "focused on the failure of non-management directors
to act effectively when confronted with evidence of management's involvement in possible
securities fraud." Id. at 89,894 n.4. W.R. Grace, on the other hand, dealt "with the obliga-
tions of officers and directors where a company's violations do not constitute fraud." Id.
232. Id. at 89,894, n.4 ("Each of these Reports focused on the failure of non-
management directors to act effectively when confronted with evidence of management's
involvement in possible securities fraud. The present matter, in contrast, deals with the
obligations of officers and directors where a company's violations do not constitute
fraud.").
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apparent purpose of the section 21(a) report was to encourage in-
creased oversight of the disclosure process by directors.233
To the extent it was attempting to alter board behavior, the
SEC was largely unsuccessful. First, there was no meaningful en-
forcement of the requirements. For provisions adopted under sec-
tion 13(a) of the Exchange Act, a private right of action did not
exist for violations.2 34 As a result, only the SEC could police the
requirements. With limited resources and perhaps 14,000 public
companies to examine, the SEC could not give significant atten-
tion to the disclosure requirements.235 Unsurprisingly, therefore,
not a single enforcement proceeding was brought for violations of
the audit or compensation committee disclosure requirements.
A private right of action did exist for violation of the proxy
rules.236 In general, however, courts were not particularly open to
causes of action based on false compensation disclosure. Courts
have, for example, concluded that a proxy statement does not be-
come misleading because of the failure to disclose certain valua-
tions placed on options. 7 Plan documents and "reasonable esti-
mates" as to the total number of shares required need not be
included.238 Similarly, proxy statements need not include infor-
mation about the compensation process that is already widely
known.239
233. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)(a) (West Supp. 2003).
234. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 494 F.2d 528, 539-41 (3d Cir. 1974); rev'd on other
grounds, 560 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977); Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management
Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 45,742, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,914, 19,917 (Apr. 12,
2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 249) (noting that private rights of action did not
exist under section 13(a)).
235. This is the number given by the SEC. See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Finan-
cial Measures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,226, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820, 4828 (Jan. 30,
2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 244, and 249).
236. An implied right of action exists under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a) (2000). The Supreme Court made this
clear in JJ Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431.
237. See Seinfeld v. Bartz, 322 F.3d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W.
3246 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2003) ("We conclude that SEC regulations do not require the use of the
Black-Scholes valuation and that the proxy statement is not materially false and mislead-
ing.").
238. Shaev v. Hampel, No. 99 Civ. 10578, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20497, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002).
239. See Vides v. Amelio, 265 F. Supp.2d 273, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("The regulations do
not require disclosure of the fact that directors determine and vote for their own compen-
sation.").
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Second, companies often resorted to boilerplate disclosure.240
Rather than provide true insight into the decision-making proc-
ess, audit and compensation committee reports often contained
vague and largely unverifiable statements.24' As a result, board
committees could make the requisite disclosure without engaging
in truly meaningful oversight.
Third, the fundamental premise of the approach was flawed.
The requirements were meant to provide shareholders with in-
creased disclosure about the board's decisionmaking process.242 To
the extent the board did not act in a rigorous fashion, sharehold-
ers could presumably bring suit for a breach of fiduciary duty.
243
In fact, however, the standards under state law were so weak
that the additional disclosure did not increase the risk of a suit
for mismanagement or disloyalty.244
Fourth, the disclosure requirements suffered from the rule of
unintended consequences. Rather than shame the board into re-
ducing compensation, they probably had the opposite effect. By
making total compensation clear, they provided officers with an
argument that they should be compensated in a manner not
unlike their competitors (or any other company used for compari-
son).245 Thus, the disclosure may well have had an upward effect
on compensation.246
Finally, efforts to force greater managerial oversight through
enforcement actions were unsuccessful. The decision in W.R.
Grace had little basis in the securities laws and instead rested
squarely on traditional notions of fiduciary obligations.247 Given
the weak grounding in the securities laws, it was little surprise
that the SEC never brought a follow-up action that expanded on
240. See Susan J. Stabile, One For A, Two For B, and Four Hundred For C: The Widen-
ing Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 115, 130 (2002) ("An examination of some of the compensation committee reports
of large public companies reveals much boilerplate language about the value of incentive-
based compensation and general compensation philosophy, but they say little about the
policies of the particular company in question.").
241. Id.
242. See Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34
B.C. L. REV. 937, 954 (1933).
243. See supra notes 8, 108-86 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
245. Stabile, supra note 240, at 131.
246. Id.
247. See supra note 231.
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the reasoning in W.R. Grace Imposing obligations on directors to
manage the disclosure process would have to wait for a firmer le-
gal foundation.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION
A. The Scandals
The lack of meaningful standards for directors generated little
debate. Occasional concerns surfaced over inflated compensation
for executive officers. Other than to note the growth of executive
salaries, the observations generated at best modest calls for re-
form.24 In part, this may have occurred because the compensa-
tion ordinarily resulted from stock options and was therefore tied
to increased share prices.24 9 Corporate excess mattered less when
everyone, including shareholders, benefited.25 °
Throughout the 1990s, therefore, self-dealing remained largely
unchecked.25' State law did not impose effective limitations.252
Neither did the market.253 The SEC required greater disclosure
but otherwise did not regulate the substance of the transactions.
Executive officers could profit from their company with little con-
cern over the impact on shareholders. 254 The consequences of this
248. See Elson, supra note 242, at 939; see also Mark A- Salky, Comment, The Regula-
tory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Nei-
ther Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (Spring/Summer 1995). In the 1990s, Congress
amended the tax law to prohibit corporations from deducting executive compensation over
one million dollars, although the provision contained exceptions including one for per-
formance based compensation. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2001).
249. Thus, Michael Eisner may have earned $500 million from options in the mid-
1990s, but he also increased the market capitalization of Disney from $2 billion to $50 bil-
lion. See Peter H. King, The Big Fish in the Pond, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at A3.
250. Of course, even during this period, officers and directors could earn large returns
without significant benefit to shareholders. Following a drop in share prices, the options
could be repriced, with the official making a positive return despite a net loss to share-
holders. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,108, 68 Fed.
Reg. 39,995, 39,996 (July 3, 2003) (discussing proposed rules by self-regulatory organiza-
tions that would require, among other things, shareholder approval of changes to option
plans that permit repricings).
251. The problem of self-dealing was not limited to the 1990s. See Elvin R. Latty, Why
Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599, 605 (1965)
("The power of the insiders--'management'--to make self-serving decisions has always
been a source of problems in corporation law.").
252. See Elson, supra note 242, at 939; see also supra notes 155-66.
253. See Elson, supra note 242, at 939.
254. See Martin Lipton, The Millennium Bubble and Its Aftermath: Reforming Corpo-
rate America and Getting Back to Business, Address to the Commercial Club of Chicago
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approach became clear with the corporate law scandals that oc-
curred early in the new millennium.255
With the collapse of Enron in November 2001, the market con-
fronted widespread examples of corporate excess. 256 Corporate
misbehavior was nothing new. Even in the 1990s, the SEC had
brought enforcement actions against a number of large companies
for inaccurate disclosure and/or self-dealing.257 In general, how-
ever, the cases were lost in the euphoria of a growing economy
and a booming stock market. Moreover, they did not, at the time,
suggest a systematic failure of the regulatory system.
The bursting of the high-tech and dot-coin bubbles, however,
ushered in a new set of circumstances. In addition to the collapse
of a vast array of start-up companies, the market witnessed the
sudden unraveling of some of the largest, and what were thought
to be the safest, public companies. At the same time, examples
surfaced of managerial excess.
While the circumstances in these companies varied, they gen-
erally had a common denominator. Top officers profited hand-
somely. Their self-dealing tended to fall into three categories.
Some involved rich compensation packages, including charitable
contributions in the officer's name,2 s5 deferred compensation with
high guaranteed annual returns,25 9 and expansive severance
packages.26° Others entailed significant trading profits in compa-
nies that later saw dramatic declines in share prices.261 Finally,
(Nov. 2002) (labeling the 1980s and the 1990s as eras of the "imperial" CEO who "domi-
nated" the board).
255. See, e.g., Brown, Shareholder Ratification, supra note 12, at 641-42.
256. See, e.g., id.
257. See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Corp., SEC Admin. Proceeding, File No. 3-10481 (May 15,
2001), available at http://www.sec.govflitigation/admin/33-7976.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2003); In re Waste Management, Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding, File No. 3-10238 (June 21,
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-42968.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2003); In re Cendent Corp., SEC Admin. Proceeding, File No. 3-10225 (June 14, 2000),
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-42933.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
258. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, In Charity, Where Does a C.E.O. End and a Company
Start?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, § 3, at 1 (discussing corporate contributions to charities
supported by executive officers and noting that "[miany retirement packages include
philanthropy as a perk").
259. See, e.g., Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Well-Hidden Perk Means Big Money for
Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at C1 (noting that senior executives at many
large corporations accept deferred compensation with a guaranteed rate of return).
260. See, e.g., Andrew Countryman, Contacts Pay Off in Deals for Perks; Execs Land
More Post-Retirement Compensation, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2002, at 1 (noting that Jack
Welch from General Electric and Louis Gerstner from IBM obtained lucrative retirement
packages).
261. See, e.g., David Olive, Many CEOs Richly Rewarded for Failure, TORONTO STAR,
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allegations arose that executive officers used corporate funds for
their own personal benefit," 2 with large corporate loans on favor-
able terms a possible example of this type of behavior.263
The self-dealing transactions did not appear to have arisen as a
result of board malfeasance.264 They did, however, suggest a cer-
tain lack of oversight.265 Directors did not act as a meaningful
check on managerial self-interest.266 Nonetheless, they arguably
did not indicate a systematic failure to comply with supervisory
duties imposed under state law.267 In fact, the problem was that
most boards probably had complied with applicable requirements.
B. Sarbanes-Oxley
The problems highlighted the need for reform. State law did
not impose meaningful standards of behavior.26 The SEC's at-
tempts to encourage higher standards through the use of disclo-
sure had not worked.269 Nor, despite all of the ink spilt on the sub-
ject, had the market generated meaningful limits on director
behavior.27 ° Some type of regulatory intervention at the federal
level was, therefore, inevitable. Congress stepped in and adopted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"),271 intruding
into areas previously left to state regulation.
Aug. 25, 2002, at A10 (listing trading profits of officers in companies that either failed or
saw significant drops in share prices).
262. E.g., SEC v. L. Dennis Kozlowski, Mark H. Swartz & Mark A. Belnick, Litigation
Release No. 17,722 (Sept. 12, 2002) at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17722.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (alleging that former CEO obtained low interest loans and used
some of funds for personal expenses).
263. See, e.g., James F. Peltz & Lisa Girion, Crisis in Corporate America: Bush Spurs
Debate over Loans to Execs, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at Cl (noting that senior managers
often received loans at below-market interest rates).
264. See Schultz & Francis, supra note 259, at A9.
265. See id.; Strom, supra note 258, at 13.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 143, 144, 172 (2001).
268. See, e.g., id.
269. See Schultz & Francis, supra note 259, at A9.
270. See id; see also supra notes 45-47.
271. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of titles 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 of the United States Code) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley]. Federal interven-
tion is not, in and of itself, proof that the system of state regulation was inefficient. None-
theless, it does call into question the argument that Delaware moderates its pro-
management bias in an effort to ward off federal intervention. See Kahan & Kamar, supra
note 17, at 740 ("Because Delaware earns substantial profits from incorporations, its law-
makers want to avoid federal intervention."); see also Engledow, supra note 48, at 148
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Sarbanes-Oxley took on a number of important tasks in con-
nection with the regulation of public companies. It addressed
problems associated with the perceived lack of independence of
outside auditors through the creation of a self-regulatory organi-
zation to oversee accounting firms272 and the imposition of limita-
tions on consulting activities of audit clients. 3 Officers and direc-
tors were given shorter time periods to disclose trading activity
274
and subjected to prohibitions on trading during black out peri-
ods.27 In the area of disclosure, Sarbanes-Oxley extended the
statute of limitations for actions under Rule 10b-5276 and man-
dated a more systematic and enhanced review of corporate filings
by the SEC. 277 Sarbanes-Oxley also required the adoption of rules
designed to regulate the activities of analysts.
In the area of corporate governance, the legislation made a
number of changes in the responsibilities of officers and directors
of public companies. The CEO and CFO had to certify financial
statements,279 with draconian penalties for willful violations.2 0
("However, this race to the bottom would have to occur in a manner that does not raise the
specter of federal intervention.").
272. Sarbanes-Oxley § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 750-53 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7211(a)).
273. Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771-72 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-11(g)).
274. Id. § 403, 116 Stat. at 788 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C)).
275. Id. § 306(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 779 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(1)).
276. Id. § 804(b), 116 Stat. at 801 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)). An action
could be maintained within two years of the date of discovery or five years from the date of
the violation. Id. The provision altered the statute of limitations established in Lampf
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361 (1991). While Sar-
banes-Oxley generally applies to public companies, the change in the statute of limitations
for actions under Rule 10b-5 would affect both public and private companies. See Sar-
banes-Oxley § 804(b), 16 Stat. at 801 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)).
277. Sarbanes-Oxley § 408, 116 Stat. at 790-91 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266).
The provision required the SEC to review filings of all companies traded on an exchange
or listed in NASDAQ "on a regular and systematic basis." Id. § 408(a). Moreover, the re-
view had to include the financial statements. Id. In determining the scheduling of reviews,
the SEC had to take into account a number of factors, including market capitalization, the
existence of prior restatements, volatility in share prices, disparities in price-earning ra-
tios by "emerging companies," and the importance of the company to any material sector of
the economy. Id. § 408(b). Whatever the schedule, an examination had to occur at least
every three years. Id. § 408(c).
278. Id. § 103(a), 116 Stat. at 755-56 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)).
279. Id. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)).
280. Id. In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley defined securities fraud as a criminal offense and
provided a maximum of twenty-five years in prison. Id. § 807, 116 Stat. at 804 (to be codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1348). The provision did not limit securities fraud to instances where a
purchase or sale has occurred. Id.
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Executive officers could no longer borrow from the company28'
and were subjected to a code of ethics.282
With respect to directors, Sarbanes-Oxley altered the responsi-
bilities of the audit committee in connection with the review of fi-
nancial information.2 3 The audit committee, which had to consist
of outside directors,2"4 was given responsibility for hiring and fir-
ing the company's independent accountant.8 5 Otherwise, Sar-
banes-Oxley did little to regulate the board. Standards for ap-
proving self-interested transactions did not change.286
1. Duties of Officers
Sarbanes-Oxley uses four different approaches in regulating of-
ficer behavior. These include: (1) categorical prohibitions on cer-
tain activities;287 (2) certification of reports filed with the SEC;28.
(3) imposition -of a code of ethics for top officers;289 and, (4) the for-
feiture of bonuses and trading profits following certain financial
restatements. 291 In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley (and the implement-
ing regulations by the SEC) effectively impose on public compa-
nies the obligation to put in place procedures designed to ensure
adequate supervision of the disclosure process.29'
281. Id. § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 755-56 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)(1)).
282. Id. § 406, 116 Stat. at 789-90 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264). Sarbanes-Oxley
only applied the code of ethics requirement to financial officers. Id. The rules adopted by
the SEC, however, apply to both the chief financial/accounting officers and the chief execu-
tive officer. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(a) (2003).
283. Sarbanes-Oxley § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2)).
284. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A)).
285. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(2)).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2003).
287. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 303(a), 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C..§
7242(a)).
288. See id. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)).
289. See id. § 406(a), 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a)). Sarbanes-
Oxley stopped short of an actual requirement, but provided that companies without a code
of ethics would have to provide a public explanation for its absence.
290. See id. § 304(a), 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243).
291. See id. §§ 401-09, 116 Stat. at 785-91 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7261-64,
78p).
[Vol. 38:317
GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
a. Loans
Most straightforward in addressing problems with self-dealing
is the categorical prohibition on loans to executive officers.292 In
the lead up to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the corporate
treasury often seemed to be a source of funds for the personal
needs of executive officers. Funds from the company were lent to
insiders to repay stock loans and for outside business purposes.
The loans were sometimes made on highly favorable terms and in
some cases in extraordinary amounts. As long as they were prop-
erly approved by informed and independent directors or disinter-
ested shareholders, state law imposed no meaningful limitations
on the loans.293
Sarbanes-Oxley addresses this conflict of interest not by rais-
ing the standards for board review, but through a categorical
prohibition.294 Except in narrow circumstances, public companies
can no longer make loans to executive officers.295 The provision
applies only to personal loans and contains a handful of narrow
exceptions.
The categorical prohibition established by Sarbanes-Oxley is
both too narrow and too broad. First, the ban is too broad because
loans to executives may at times benefit the company. A bridge
loan to facilitate a CEO's relocation, a short-term loan to enable
executive officers to exercise stock options, or a fully documented
personal loan to the CFO at higher than market interest rates, all
may conceivably benefit the company. Nonetheless, under Sar-
banes-Oxley, all of the above-listed are prohibited.296
292. See id. § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 787 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)). The prohi-
bition also applies to directors.
293. This was not always the case. At one time, most states barred executive loans. See
Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans To Directors and Officers: Every Business Now A
Bank?, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 237, 241 (1988); Richard W. Jennings, The Role of the States in
Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 199 (1958).
294. Sarbanes-Oxley § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 787 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78m(k)).
295. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 787 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78m(k)).
296. Id. Sarbanes-Oxley does not address the practical problems of credit extensions
that include such transactions like cash advances. These types of "loans" arguably do not
fall within the prohibition because they are not "personal." Nonetheless, the noticeable
absence of explanation and legislative history leaves the treatment of even these basic
transactions unclear. See id.
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At the same time, the provision is too narrow. The loans to ex-
ecutives often effectively amount to an additional form of com-
pensation. Whether at below market interest rates or forgiven
over a period of time, they can financially benefit the borrowing
officer. Sarbanes-Oxley's prohibition essentially forecloses this
type of compensation but otherwise does nothing to address the
problem of executive compensation. Indeed, given the ban on
loans, the company can simply purchase the asset outright and
give it to the officer.2
9 7
b. Repayment of Compensation
Sarbanes-Oxley also includes a provision designed to force the
CEO and CFO to repay compensation to the company as a pen-
alty for inaccurate financial disclosure.29 The provision was in-
tended to address the practice of corporate insiders selling large
amounts of stock while engaging in questionable accounting prac-
tices that were later reversed.
Under section 304, bonuses paid, or trading profits realized, in
the twelve months after the issuance of financial statements,
must be repaid by the CEO and CFO if the financial statements
are subsequently restated.299 The provision only applies to re-
statements that result from material noncompliance with a fi-
nancial reporting requirement and from misconduct. 30 The provi-
sion applies to any incentive or equity-based compensation.0 1
As with the prohibition on loans, the provision seems simulta-
neously too broad and too narrow. First, the provision is designed
to punish misconduct by executive officers, but not otherwise to
limit executive compensation. Nothing in the provision prevents a
company from richly compensating a CEO or CFO during periods
297. E.g., Allan Sloan, Don't Write Obituary for Options Just Yet, WASH. POST, July 15,
2003, at E3 (noting that Microsoft no longer will give employees stock options, but instead
will give them stock).
298. Sarbanes-Oxley § 304(a), 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)).
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id. § 304(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(1)). The
CEO or CFO must reimburse the company for "any bonus or other incentive-based or eq-
uity-based compensation received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month pe-
riod following the first public issuance or filing with the [SEC] (whichever first occurs) of
the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement...." Id.
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of aggressive accounting treatment. The company can avoid the
risk of forfeiture simply by paying amounts that are not perform-
ance or equity-based. A doubling of the CEO's base salary also
will not fall within the provision.
Second, section 304 is too broad. For example, it may punish a
CEO and CFO who did not engage in, or even know about, the
misconduct that caused the restatement. Nor does this section re-
quire that the misconduct result from a failure of the CEO or
CFO to adequately supervise. The provision can, for example, ap-
ply to a restatement necessitated by the discovery of embezzle-
ment by an employee. Thus, in at least some instances, the CEO
and CFO may have to disgorge compensation for behavior he or
she could not realistically control.
Sarbanes-Oxley also seems to require forfeiture of perform-
ance-based compensation even if the performance is unrelated to
the restatement. A performance-based bonus paid because a CEO
successfully prevents bankruptcy or obtains rapid Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval of a new drug will still, appar-
ently, be subject to forfeiture following an unrelated restatement.
Moreover, restatements do not necessarily require changes in ag-
gregate profitability. Thus, the provision could result in the for-
feiture of a bonus even where the same bonus would have been
paid even had the restated financial statements been in place.
c. Code of Ethics
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires public companies to disclose in
their annual report whether they have in place a written code of
ethics applicable to "senior financial officers."" 2 Section 406 stops
short of mandating the use of a code but does require an explana-
tion if one does not exist. The company's code must contain stan-
dards "reasonably necessary to promote ... honest and ethical
conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent con-
flicts of interest between personal and professional relation-
ships,"" 3 accurate and timely disclosure, and compliance with
302. See id. § 406(a), 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a)). Section
406(a) specifically includes the principal financial officer and comptroller or principal ac-
counting officer or persons performing similar functions. See id. The Commission, how-
ever, extended the requirement to the CEO. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(a) (2003).
303. Sarbanes-Oxley § 406(c)(1), 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
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governmental rules and regulations." 4 In addition, "prompt" dis-
closure must be made of changes in, or waivers to, the code of eth-
ics. 3 5 Disclosure may take place through the filing of a current
report on Form 8-K, over the Internet, "or by other electronic
means."
30 6
Section 406 seems unlikely to change management's behavior
for a host of reasons. First, under the provision, companies need
not put codes in place. Second, even if codes are enacted, such
ethics provisions may not be particularly rigorous. Third, there is
no private enforcement mechanism. Even SEC enforcement is
limited in scope. Although flawed in many respects, by extending
the corporate code of ethics to the CEO, the SEC narrowed a gap
left by Congress.
d. Certification
Sarbanes-Oxley ordered the SEC to adopt, within thirty days,
rules requiring top officers to certify the contents of certain re-
ports filed with the SEC.307 Pursuant to the SEC's rules, each an-
nual and quarterly report filed by a company308 must be certified.
The CEO and CFO3 °9 must certify310 that, to the best of their
knowledge, the report contains no untrue statement of material
fact and that the financial statements "fairly present[]" the condi-
tion of the company. 311 Sarbanes-Oxley imposes stiff penalties,
7264(c)(1)).
304. See id. § 406(c)(2)-(3), 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(c)(2)-
(3)).
305. See id. § 406(b), 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(b)).
306. Id.
307. See id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
308. The SEC determined that the provision did not apply to current reports on Form
8-K because they do not fall within the definition of periodic report. See Certification of
Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
46,427, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276, 57,278 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Certification of Disclosure]
("Reports that are current reports, such as reports on Forms 6-K and 8-K, rather than pe-
riodic (quarterly and annual) reports are not covered by the certification requirement.").
309. Specifically, the provision applies to the principal financial officer, or officers, and
the principal executive officer, "or persons performing similar functions." 17 C.F.R. §
229.406(a) (2003).
310. The rule does provide that persons certifying the filing must physically sign the
document. Use of a power of attorney is not permitted. Id. § 240.13a-14(d).
311. Id. The SEC also provided a draft certificate and admonished that the language
could not be varied. See Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,280; see also Man-
agement's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Dis-
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with fines of up to five million dollars and prison terms of up to
twenty years, for violations.
31 2
Certification of the annual and quarterly reports means some-
thing more than attesting to compliance with generally accepted
accounting principles ("GAAP").313 As the SEC has noted, "fair
presentation" of the company's financial condition
encompasses the selection of appropriate accounting policies, proper
application of appropriate accounting policies, disclosure of financial
information that is informative and reasonably reflects the underly-
ing transactions and events and the inclusion of any additional dis-
closure necessary to provide investors with a materially accurate and
complete picture of an issuer's financial condition, results of opera-
tions and cash flows.
3 14
The benefits of certification remain unclear. The need to certify
does not in any way alter the existing signature requirements.315
The adopting release noted only that the officers "providing a
false certification" could be liable under section 13(a) of the Ex-
change316 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.1 7 Under
section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, the failure to maintain proper
procedures can violate the provision even if the company makes
proper disclosure." ' No private right of action exists for violations
closure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986, 68 Fed.
Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter Management's Report on Internal Control] (modi-
fying certificate language).
312. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 906, 116 Stat. at 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350).
The SEC has taken the position that sections 906 and 302 are separate certification re-
quirements. See Certification of Disclosure in Certain Exchange Act Reports, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-47551, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,600 (Mar. 31, 2003). ("Section 906 contains a
certification requirement that is separate and distinct from the certification requirement
mandated by Section 302.").
313. Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,279.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 57,280 ("The required certification is in addition to, and, thus, does not al-
ter, the current signature requirements for quarterly and annual reports filed under the
Exchange Act."). Those who sign a report can be held liable for the content. See, e.g., How-
ard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing United States v.
Gomez-Gutierrez, 140 F.3d 1287, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1998); Newby v. Enron Corp., 258 F.
Supp. 2d 576 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
316. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881,894 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000)).
317. See Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,280 ("An issuer's principal execu-
tive and financial officers already are responsible as signatories for the issuer's disclosures
under the Exchange Act liability provisions and can be liable for material misstatements
or omissions under general antifraud standards.").
318. See id. at 57,281, n.74 (noting that the failure to implement proper controls and
procedures could violate section 13 even if "the failure did not lead to flawed disclosure.").
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of this section. The SEC could, however, maintain an action for a
violation and impose various penalties and fines.319
e. Procedures
The certificate requirement also embodies broad procedural re-
quirements designed to ensure that officers remain informed.32 °
Specifically, companies must maintain, and the certificate must
acknowledge, that officers are responsible for the adoption of in-
ternal controls and procedures. 32 1 "Disclosure controls and proce-
dures" encompass those necessary to ensure that information in
reports filed with the SEC are "recorded, processed, summarized
and reported, within the [required] time periods." 322 This includes
anything necessary to assess "developments and risks that per-
tain to the issuer's businesses" and to meet the completeness re-
quirements in Exchange Act Rule 12b-20.323 The procedures also
must be sufficient to provide the information necessary for any
SEC filing, including those not subject to the certification re-
quirement such as current reports and proxy statements.324
In addition, companies must maintain "internal control over fi-
nancial reporting."32' This includes the process "designed by, or
under the supervision of' the CFO or CEO that will "provide rea-
sonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles."326
319. See supra note 234. Not a year had elapsed before the SEC brought its first action
for a violation of the provision. See SEC v. Owens, Litigation Release No. 18,059 (Apr. 1,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18059.htm (last visited Nov.
13, 2003).
320. Management's Report on Internal Control, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986, 68
Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,666 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(e)).
321. Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,277.
322. Management's Report on Internal Control, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,666 (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(e)).
323. Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,281.
324. See id. at 57,278-79 ("Disclosure controls and procedures, however, are required
to be designed, maintained and evaluated to ensure full and timely disclosure in current
reports, as well as definitive proxy materials and definitive information statements, even
though there is no specific certification requirement relating to reports on those forms.").
325. Management's Report on Internal Control, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,666 (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(c)).
326. Id. at 36,640 n.50.
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The SEC has not specified any particular procedures,327 al-
though the adopting release did recommend the formation of a
committee "with responsibility for considering the materiality of
information and determining disclosure obligations on a timely
basis."32 Moreover, the committee shall "report to senior man-
agement. 3 29 This presumably means the officers are required to
execute the certificate.
The release does contain what amounts to a list of objectives.
The procedures must ensure that the information is communi-
cated to management, including the CEO and CFO.330 These pro-
cedures must permit "timely collection and evaluation" of infor-
mation required by Regulation S-X and Regulation S-K.331
Moreover, the process is not static but requires constant exami-
nation.332 The procedure should "ensure that an issuer's systems
grow and evolve with its business and are capable of producing
Exchange Act reports that are timely, accurate and reliable."333
327. See Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,280 ("[W]e are not requiring any
particular procedures for conducting the required review and evaluation.").
328. Id. The Commission noted that the committee should contain the principal ac-
counting officer, the general counsel, the principal risk management officer, and the chief
investor relations officer. Id. at 57,280 n.60. Others may be present on the committee. This
may need to include, for example, representatives of significant business segments of the
company. Id.
329. Id. at 57,280.
330. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(c) (2003). The CEO and CFO must certify that the con-
trols and procedures "ensure that material information" is made known to them during
the period when periodic reports are being prepared. Id. § 240.13a-14(b)(4)(i).
331. Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,281.
332. In addition to the establishment of procedures, companies must undertake a regu-
lar evaluation of their effectiveness. The evaluation must occur within the ninety-day pe-
riod prior to the filing date. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(b) (2003). The certifying officers must
produce a report that includes their conclusions on the effectiveness of the procedures. Id.
§ 240.13a-14(b)(4)(iii). The certifying officers also have an obligation to disclose to the
auditors and to the audit committee any deficiencies in the controls, any fraud by anyone
with a significant role in the company's internal controls, and any significant changes in
the controls, "including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses." Id. § 240.13a-14(b)(5)-(6). In assessing effectiveness, the CEO and
CFO must determine whether the procedures work. At a minimum, this means that the
system assigns the task of accumulating the necessary information and drafting the requi-
site reports in a timely fashion to the appropriate individuals. In addition to determining
whether the system worked and these individuals performed their assigned task, an
evaluation should ask about methods to improve the process. This might include the addi-
tion of other corporate officials to the process, the reassignment of responsibilities to more
appropriate individuals, more detailed review by the board of directors, and changes in the
timeline to ensure all of this occurs.
333. Certification of Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,281.
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Sarbanes-Oxley also requires an assessment of internal con-
trols and the annual disclosure of a report concerning the as-
sessment.334 The report must state the responsibility of manage-
ment for establishing and maintaining "an adequate internal
control structure and procedures for financial reporting. ' 35 In ad-
dition, the report needs to contain an assessment of the effective-
ness of the procedures and the company's internal control over fi-
nancial reporting.336 The auditor must attest to the report.337
The new procedures may have some impact on state fiduciary
obligations. They will provide executive officers with additional
information and require that these officers take steps consistent
with their fiduciary duty.338 The broader impact, however, is
likely to be on the federal securities laws. The existence of exten-
sive procedures may make it easier to show scienter. The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") toughened
the requirements for pleading scienter.339 Cases are often dis-
missed where, despite evidence of inaccurate disclosure, plaintiffs
cannot show that the officers knew that the disclosure was
false.34° By ensuring that top officers receive considerable infor-
mation about the financial condition of the company, knowledge
will be easier to prove.
334. See Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262). The report must be included in the annual report. See Form
10-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 9$ 31, 101-31, 107, at 22,061-71 (2003); see also Regula-
tion S-K, Item 308(c), 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,663 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 229.308(c)).
335. Management's Report on Internal Control, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986, 68
Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,637 (June 18, 2003).
336. Reg. S-K, Item 308, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,663 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.308);
Management's Report on Internal Control, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,636.
337. See Reg. S-K, Item 308(b), 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,663 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
229.308(b)).
338. Once the board obtains information, the failure to act can constitute deliberate
neglect and bad faith. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del.
Ch. 2003); see also Abbott Laboratories Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 808 (7th
Cir. 2003).
339. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified in scattered sections of titles 15 and 18 of the United States Code).
340. See Kushner v. Beverly Enters., 317 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[I]nvestors at-
tempt to make out a strong inference of scienter based upon circumstantial evidence-
namely, that it was reckless for the defendants not to know of the scheme given its sheer
size and its effect on the company's core business.").
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2. Duties of Directors
Sarbanes-Oxley also imposes additional obligations at the
board level. Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley increases the role of the
audit committee by providing additional authority, ensuring the
independence of the members, and requiring a certain amount of
expertise.34' Section 301 directs the SEC to require the self-
regulatory organizations ("SROs") to adopt rules governing the
audit committee of the board. 42 Among other things, the audit
committee can only contain independent directors.343 Moreover,
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates a definition of "independent" far more
strict than anything required by state law or SROs.344 Despite
these changes, however, Sarbanes-Oxley leaves the duties of di-
rectors largely unchanged.
a. The Board
With the exception of the audit committee, Sarbanes-Oxley
does little to regulate directly the activities of the board. In addi-
tion to executive officers, the categorical prohibition on loans also
applies to directors.3 45 Directors are prohibited from trading dur-
ing blackout periods346 and required to report their trades in a
more rapid fashion.3 47 The SEC now has the authority to adopt
rules prohibiting officers and directors from interfering with au-
dits in an effort to create misleading financial statements. 348
More significantly, the SROs-the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX") and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")-have imple-
mented broad changes to the board structure, although these are
not directly mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley. Specifically, the NYSE
has required greater board independence and an increased role
341. Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407(a), 116 Stat. 745, 790 (2002) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a)).
342. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)).
343. Id. § 301, 116 Stat. 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A)).
344, See id. § 301, 116 Stat. 776 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)(i)-(ii)).
345, See id. § 402, 116 Stat. 787 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m).
346. See id. § 306, 116 Stat. 779-84 (to be codified in scattered sections of titles 15 and
29 of the United States Code).
347. See id. § 403, 116 Stat. 788-89 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p).
348. See id. § 303, 116 Stat. 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242).
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for independent directors.349 The listing standards will require a
majority of the board to consist of independent directors and will
tighten the definition of independent. 5 °
The listing standards also require non-management directors
to meet in executive session to facilitate "open discussion."3
51
Listed companies must form a compensation committee, 352 an au-
dit committee,353 and a nomination/governance committee.354
Each must consist entirely of independent directors, have a writ-
ten charter, and provide for an assessment of its annual perform-
ance.355 The nomination committee has been granted sole author-
ity to hire and fire any search firm used in locating director
candidates.356
b. Audit Committee
Most significantly, Sarbanes-Oxley contains significant
changes to the audit committee, largely preempting state law. 7
In effect, the audit committee of a public company is now directly
responsible for the financial disclosure process. In addition, Sar-
banes-Oxley also addresses membership requirements, including
the need for expertise. 3 1 Most of the provisions will be imple-
349. See N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc. & Nat'l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Order Approv-
ing Proposed Rule Changes and Amendments No. 1 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No.
34-48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,157-58 (Nov. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Order Approving
Proposed Rule]; see also Notice of Filing a Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1
Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate Governance, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-47,672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051 (Apr. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Pro-
posed Rule].
350. See Order Approving Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 64,157-58.
351. See Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 19,053. The sessions should be scheduled on a
regular basis. The standards do not require the appointment of a lead director to run the
meetings. Companies must disclose the method by which interested parties could commu-
nicate with the presiding director or the non-management directors as a group. See id.
352. See Order Approving Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 64,158 (Section 303A.5).
353. See id. at 64,158-59 (Section 303A.7).
354. See id. at 64,158 (Section 303A.4).
355. See id. at 64,158-59. The charter must be posted on the company's Web site. See
id. at 64,159.
356. See Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 19,054.
357. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25 (2002) (providing that, unless stated otherwise
in articles or bylaws, the board has the power to create committees, appoint directors, and
determine authority). The only limits on a committee's authority are those expressly con-
tained in the corporate code. See id. § 8.25(e).
358. See Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301(m), 116 Stat. 745, 775 (2002) (to
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mented through the use of listing standards of the SROs." 9 To
the extent that companies fail to comply with the rules, they can
be delisted.36
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, a company must form an audit commit-
tee that "shall be directly responsible for the appointment, com-
pensation, and oversight" of the auditor.361 The committee must
have the ability to engage "independent counsel and other advis-
ers" as necessary and have "appropriate funding" to perform its
functions.362 What constitutes "appropriate funding" is deter-
mined by the audit committee not by the board."363
Only independent directors can sit on this committee.364 Inde-
pendence means that the directors may not accept any consulting,
advisory, or other compensatory fees from the company and may
only accept those fees associated with serving on the board.365 In
addition, the committee must establish procedures for accepting
complaints, including "confidential, anonymous submission[s] by
employees."366
The audit committee should also have at least one financial ex-
pert.367 Sarbanes-Oxley assigns to the SEC the task of writing the
rules defining the qualifications for the expert.368 An expert must
at least have an understanding of GAAP, experience in the
preparation of financial statements and the application of ac-
counting principals to "estimates, accruals, and reserves," and "an
understanding of audit committee functions."369
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)).
359. See id. § 3(b), 116 Stat. at 749 (to be codified at 15 § U.S.C. 7202(b)).
360. Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A)).
361. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2)).
362. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(5)).
363. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(6)).
364. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)).
365. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B) (i)).
366. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)).
367. Sarbanes-Oxley actually stops short of mandating the presence of such a director.
Instead, the SEC must adopt rules requiring the company to disclose that the audit com-
mittee had one such director or the reasons why it did not. Id. § 407(a), 116 Stat. 790 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a)).
368. Id. § 407(c), 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(c)).
369. Id. § 407(b), 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(c)).
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c. Problems
The provisions regulating the audit committee, on their sur-
face, reduce the domination of the board by the CEO. Not only
does Sarbanes-Oxley prevent the CEO from placing inside direc-
tors on the audit committee, 370 but the CEO cannot hire and fire
the outside auditor.37'
Because of Sarbanes-Oxley's reliance on the rules of SROs to
enforce provisions, major flaws exist in the Act's structure. First,
the rules are largely unenforceable. Implemented primarily
through listing standards, a private right of action does not exist
for violation of these requirements.372 Private parties, therefore,
cannot bring suit to enforce the listing requirements.
Stock exchange enforcement of listing standards has tradition-
ally been modest given the limited penalties that can be imposed.
Sarbanes-Oxley attempts to toughen the sanctions by ordering
delisting for violations, but companies must get an opportunity to
cure any defects.373 Directors, therefore, know that there will be
little or no consequence for violations until detection, and even
then there will be an opportunity to cure.
In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley's definition of independence for
the audit committee does not go far enough to ensure a neutral
decision making process. Members cannot receive any payment
from the company except directors' fees.374 Sarbanes-Oxley does
not tamper with state law cases characterizing a director as inde-
pendent, even though he or she has longstanding business and
personal ties to the CEO. Sarbanes-Oxley does not alter the line
of Delaware cases concerning payments to a charity run by a di-
rector.375 The Sarbanes-Oxley also seems to provide that directors'
370. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 796 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)).
371. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(2)).
372. See BROWN, REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 6, at § 3.06[5].
373. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
l(m)(1)).
374. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)).
375. Thus, Father O'Donovan, the President of Georgetown, was considered an inde-
pendent director on the board of Disney despite contributions of one million dollars by Mi-
chael Eisner, the CEO, to the University. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731
A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998), rev'd in part, affd in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000). See also In re The Ltd., Inc., S'holders Litig., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *11
(Del. Ch. 2002).
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fees will never deprive a director of independence, no matter the
amount.376
More noticeably, however, Sarbanes-Oxley's definition of inde-
pendence extends only to members of the audit committee. 377 Di-
rectors involved in the financial review process will, therefore,
have a somewhat higher degree of independence.37 The same re-
quirement does not extend to those directors serving on other
board committees or directors approving self-dealing transactions
by management.
Finally, and perhaps most critically, Sarbanes-Oxley does noth-
ing to alter the director nomination process.379 To the extent
nominations are controlled or strongly influenced by the CEO, a
common phenomenon, boards are likely to contain large numbers
of "independent" directors who remain closely aligned with the
CEO. Moreover, with the high fees paid to directors of the largest
public companies, they have an incentive to engage in behavior
376. Courts in Delaware have indicated that payment of directors fees will not result in
a loss of independence. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988) ("The only aver-
ment permitting such an inference is the allegation that all GM's directors are paid for
their services as directors. However, such allegations, without more, do not establish any
financial interest."). See also In re The Ltd. S'holders Litig., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at
*17 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("Allegations as to one's position as a director and the receipt of di-
rector's fees, without more, however, are not enough for purposes of pleading demand fu-
tility."). At least one court has noted that this may not be the case where the fees "were
shown to exceed materially what is commonly understood and accepted to be usual and
customary." Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 29 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2002). Nonetheless, no
Delaware case has ever found that the amount of fees resulted in a loss of independence.
This is true despite the significant amounts routinely paid to directors. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, Discussion Pa-
per No. 421, at 3 (2003) at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/
pdf/421.pdf. (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (noting that for the 200 largest United States cor-
porations in 2001, the average fee paid to directors was $152,626; directors of Enron were
paid $380,000).
377. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(3)).
378. See id.
379. Although not in Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has been considering reforms in this
area that would facilitate the election of directors not supported by management. See Staff
Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors,
Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (July 15, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
The staff analysis has resulted in two proposals, one to increase required disclosure about
the nominating process (Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communications Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 48301 (Aug. 8, 2003)), and another to require, in narrow circumstances, that the
company include a shareholder nomination in the proxy statement. See Security Holder
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48626 (Oct. 14, 2003).
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designed to keep them on the board. To the extent the CEO con-
trols the election process, directors will have an economic incen-
tive to avoid challenging or second guessing the CEO.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
In specific areas of corporate governance, many states have
opted for a management-friendly approach to regulation.
Whether a competition to retain corporate charters380 or a conse-
quence of lobbying,8 1 the result has been the same. States have
favored management by adopting waiver of liability provisions,
increasing the discretion of the board, particularly in the area of
self-dealing, and facilitating management job retention, particu-
larly through approval of anti-takeover tactics. This approach
does not appear likely to change.8 2
When states granted excessive discretion to management in
the past, Congress intervened and, with the adoption of the fed-
eral securities laws, effectively took away their control over the
financial disclosure and voting process. Sarbanes-Oxley repre-
380. See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
382. Having said that, it is only fair to note that a number of recent Delaware cases
have taken a harder line toward management's fiduciary duties. In two cases, the chan-
cery court declined to defer to a special litigation committee because the members lacked
independence. See Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A,2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). In another instance, the Supreme Court of
Delaware all but inexplicably declined to permit the granting of a motion to dismiss in a
duty of loyalty case, again leaving open the possibility that the board may have lacked in-
dependence. See Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003). Finally, the chancery court
on remand in Disney allowed the case involving severance payments to Michael Ovitz to go
forward on the ground that, to the extent the board acted with intentional disinterest, the
business judgment rule did not apply. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825
A.2d 275, 285-87 (Del. Ch. 2003). These cases may suggest a desire by the Delaware
courts to make fiduciary duties more meaningful. Such an approach would reduce the
pressure for further federal preemption of the area. See Coffee, supra note 96, at 5 (noting
that one law firm speculated that decisions were motivated by the Delaware court's desire
to prevent further federal legislation). Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether the positions
in cases such as Oracle and Disney will be upheld by the Supreme Court of Delaware. See
e.g., supra note 176 (nothing that the Supreme Court of Delaware has never expressly ap-
proved rationale stated by the court of chancery in Caremark). Subsequent decisions also
could construe these opinions so narrowly they would have little impact on the governance
process. Finally, these cases did not change areas of critical importance such as the appli-
cation of the business judgment standard to self-dealing transactions approved by disin-
terested directors.
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sents another instance of federal intrusion seeking to compensate
for lax standards at the state level." 3
Sarbanes-Oxley forces the board to be more informed, largely
supplanting Delaware law concerning the duty to monitor. Coun-
sel must report to management suspected breaches of fiduciary
duties.3" Companies are required to put in place information
gathering systems3 85-a requirement that has effectively over-
turned Delaware law. Sarbanes-Oxley increases both the stan-
dards for, and the duties of, directors on the audit committee.8 6
Sarbanes-Oxley also addresses self-interested transactions, in-
cluding loans to executives and performance-based compensa-
tion.38 7
In connection with the duties and obligations of management,
however, Sarbanes-Oxley is at best an incomplete solution. While
changing some aspects of the governance process, Sarbanes-Oxley
does not impose systematic, uniform standards. 8 Sarbanes-
Oxley does not alter the fiduciary standards applicable to officers
and directors or improve the procedural mechanisms used to sup-
plant substantive review. The definition of "independent direc-
tor," for purposes of approving self-interested transactions, re-
mains a matter of state law. 38 9 Sarbanes-Oxley does not change
383. Sarbanes-Oxley does not, therefore, go as far as Professor Cary suggested. In addi-
tion to federal standards for fiduciary duties, Professor Cary recommended federal legisla-
tion that would impose uniform standards designed to limit management's authority to
control the agenda for shareholder meetings, to increase the number of matters that re-
quired shareholder approval, to abolish nonvoting shares, to limit indemnification, and to
adopt a long-arm provision designed "to apply to all transactions within the corporate
structure involving shareholders, directors, and officers." Cary, supra note 11, at 702.
384. Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307(1), 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1)).
385. See id. § 302(a)(4), 116 Stat. at 777-88 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)).
386. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)).
387. See id. §§ 304, 402, 116 Stat. 778, 787-88 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7243,
78m).
388. An alternative would be to end the race to the bottom by eliminating the right of
states to compete for charters. This could be done by a federal statute that restricted
choice when it came to the selection of the state of incorporation. Thus, for example, corpo-
rations could be allowed to incorporate in states where they conducted a substantial
amount of business. While this would reduce competition, it would not guarantee uniform
standards.
389. Sarbanes-Oxley § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3));
see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate
Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (2003).
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the impact of independent approval, including the elimination of
fairness in the judicial review of a self-interested transaction.39 °
Thus, nothing in Sarbanes-Oxley prevents a company from
again issuing a retirement package that includes free use of
apartments, cut flowers, courtside tickets, and access to the cor-
porate jet.391 Nothing in Sarbanes-Oxley prevents a board from
issuing millions of stock options to executive officers, thereby pro-
viding an incentive to engage in aggressive accounting practices
designed to raise share prices.
Sarbanes-Oxley also does nothing to prevent the CEO from
controlling the nomination process for directors. As long as the
CEO retains the ability to select directors for nomination and
election, including independent directors, the board's ability to
supervise self-interested transactions remains in doubt.
To address these omissions, federal law needs to address three
concerns about the governance of public companies. First, federal
law should make the disinterested approval process more rigor-
ous by providing a broader definition of "independent" director.
Sarbanes-Oxley does prohibit those serving on the audit commit-
tee from receiving any payment from the company other than
directors' fees.392 This is a fairly objective and reasonable
definition of independent and is in some ways more strict than
the prevailing definition under Delaware law. The approach,
however, applies only to members of the audit committee and
omits other factors that could impair independence.393
Any definition should start with the standard for independence
used by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Aronson v. Lewis"'-
that the "director's decision [be] based on the corporate merits of
the subject before the board rather than extraneous considera-
390. See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text. Of course, if the courts will not
examine fairness, the likelihood that the independent committee will do so remains an
open question. Thus, it is possible that no one in the transaction ever examines its fair-
ness.
391. Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric, reportedly received these bene-
fits when he retired from the company. Geraldine Fabrikant, G.E. Expenses for Ex-Chief
Cited in Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at C1. Ultimately, he agreed to give some of
them up. Editorial, Atonement in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at A14.
392. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
l(m)(3)(i)).
393. See discussions of Oracle and Scrushy, supra note 382.
394. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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tions or influences." '395 At some level, it might seem unexpected to
start with Delaware law as a basis for a federal standard. With
the exception of In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation,396 how-
ever, Delaware courts have narrowly construed "extraneous con-
siderations or influences,"397 limiting the phrase almost exclu-
sively to directors with a material financial interest in the
company.39 In general, the Aronson standard has been deter-
mined not to include: (1) friendships;399 (2) outside business rela-
tionships;4 °° (3) directors' fees, even when they were a material
part of an individual's income;4 ' (4) prior40 2 and sometimes even
current employment with the company;40 3 and (5) payments from
the company that do not directly benefit the director.4 4 The
phrase also does not include the receipt of significant payments
that are not material to the individual director.40 5
The federal definition would need to recognize explicitly that
non-financial interests can impair independence. As a result, the
statute, or more likely, implementing rules, should define catego-
ries of relationships that presumptively render a director not in-
dependent. The NYSE has already proposed to do this, calling for
395. Id. at 816.
396. 824 A.2d 917, 939 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("Without backtracking from these general
propositions, it would be less than candid if I did not admit that Delaware courts have ap-
plied these general standards in a manner that has been less than wholly consistent.").
397. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816.
398. See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993) (discussing that a director
will be interested when receiving a personal finance benefit). The phrase "extraneous
considerations or influences" also includes certainly family relationships. See Oracle, 824
A.2d at 939 n.53.
399. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 939. ("Likewise, there is admittedly case law that gives little
weight to ties of friendship in the independence inquiry.").
400. In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), the court
noted abjectly that Michael Ovitz and Michael Eisner had business relationships outside
of the company but refused, with little description or discussion, to conclude that they
rendered Eisner interested in the outcome and therefore not independent. Id. at 355. On
this ground, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the chancery court, in Brehm v. Eis-
ner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
401. See Disney, 731 A.2d at 359-60 (discussing the independence of elementary school
principal).
402. See id. at 358 (discussing the independence of former executives of company).
403. See id. at 356-57 (discussing the independence of Roy Disney who also served as
officer of company).
404. See id. at 359 (discussing the independence of Father O'Donovan, President of
Georgetown University).
405. See id. at 360 (discussing independent status of Senator Mitchell, who received, in
addition to directors' fees, a $50,000 payment for consulting).
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the elimination from the definition any director who, during the
previous three years, was or had a family member employed by
the company. °6 Similarly, Sarbanes-Oxley defined "independent"
for purposes of the audit committee as anyone who does not re-
ceive, directly or indirectly, any payment from the company other
than directors' fees.
40 7
Once a broader definition of independent is in place, the second
step will be to create a federal standard that alters the conse-
quences of disinterested and independent approval of self-
interested transactions. Approval should not result in the appli-
cation of the business judgment rule and the attendant elimina-
tion of judicial review of fairness. Disinterested and independent
approval should, however, have some benefit, both to encourage
its use and to reduce judicial involvement in the decision-making
process. This could be accomplished by a federal standard that
shifts the burden of proving fairness (or unfairness) to the plain-
tiff. Delaware courts already use such a burden, but only in the
relatively narrow context of transactions between controlling
shareholders and the company.0 8
Such a standard would retain some degree of judicial review of
fairness. This does not mean excessive involvement of courts in
the business of the corporation. At the same time, the courts
would have a residual right to examine transactions even if ap-
proved by disinterested directors. Thus, the questionable loans to
the former CEO of Worldcom, Inc., Bernie Ebbers, would be sub-
ject to review even if approved in a procedurally correct man-
ner.
409
Finally, federal law should impose standards that restrict the
ability of management to influence the process of electing direc-
tors. Assuming an adequate definition of independent director
406. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate
Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051 (Apr. 17, 2003)
(proposing a five-year cooling-off period).
407. Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002) (to be codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. 78j-l(m)(3)).
408. See Brown, Shareholder Ratification, supra note 12, at 642; see also supra note
161.
409. See Dennis R. Beresford et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative
Committee of the Board of Directors of Worldcom, Inc., at 292-313 (Mar. 31, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/000093176303001862/dex99l.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
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emerges, the most appropriate approach would be to require the
board to form a nominating committee and restrict membership
to independent directors. Consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley and
the treatment of audit committees, the nominating committee
should have independent financing to enable it to adequately per-
form its duties without untoward influence from interested mem-
bers of the board.41°
Examples of "unfair" self-dealing will always exist. In the ab-
sence of these proposed reforms, future transactions will continue
to have few limits, and competition among states will continue to
prevent the implementation of meaningful standards.411 As a re-
sult, excessive amounts of improper self-dealing will again occur.
Allowing for federal standards in this area will provide more
meaningful standards while leaving to states other areas of re-
form. States could still compete for charters (or to prevent rein-
corporations) but they would have to do so not by racing to the
bottom but rather by devising more efficient laws that enhance
the value of the shares of public companies.
VII. CONCLUSION
The competition among states resulted in the weakening of du-
ties imposed on directors. In particular, courts lost the authority
to examine the fairness of transactions involving conflicts of in-
terest. The lack of standards contributed to the excesses that re-
sulted in the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. Sarbanes-Oxley to some
extent filled this void in the governance process primarily by im-
posing new requirements on officers and directors.
Congress did not oust states entirely from the corporate reform
process.412 Sarbanes-Oxley mostly addresses corporate govern-
410. Perhaps the greatest impediment to insurgent shareholders in the nomination
process concerns the costs associated with proxy contests. State law could devise a mecha-
nism whereby the company pays the costs of the distribution of materials concerning the
insurgent nominees. Given that public companies distribute the information required in
the federal proxy rules, the solution might be an amendment to those rules requiring in-
clusion in the proxy statement distributed by management. The SEC is considering re-
forms in this area. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No.
48626 (Oct. 14, 2003).
411. But see, e.g., supra text accompanying note 219.
412. Congress' approach stops short of federal incorporation, a notion Professor Cary
correctly labeled "politically unrealistic." Cary, supra note 20, at 700. There are many rea-
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ance issues. States are left to regulate, compete, and innovate in
other areas.413 Delaware, for example, became the first state to
adopt a provision that permits virtual shareholder meetings.414
Other states will likely follow suit, no doubt with some varia-
tion.415
Nonetheless, while Sarbanes-Oxley supplanted much of state
regulation, the legislation did not do enough to properly reform
the governance process. Sarbanes-Oxley did not change the stan-
dards for reviewing director behavior or make more meaningful
the approval process for self-interested transactions. Nor did Sar-
banes-Oxley significantly alter the influence of the CEO over the
director nomination process.
The result is that state law will remain the source of duties and
responsibilities for directors, at least those not preempted by Sar-
banes-Oxley. At the same time, the competition for charters will
ensure that the duties are not meaningful. The result will likely
be future federal intervention and the more complete removal of
states from the governance process.
sons to avoid federal incorporation besides being "unrealistic." Uniform federal standards
in carefully delimited areas leave the remainder of corporate regulation to the states.
States, therefore, have the ability to experiment with their corporate law, something that
could result in positive reforms. See, e.g., supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
413. See Kahan and Kamar, supra note 17, at 747 (noting that federal reform would
likely be slower than reform at the state level).
414. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2001); see also supra note 66. Inforte Corp., the
first company to conduct a virtual meeting of shareholders, increased the number of at-
tendees but at the same time did not allow shareholders to ask questions. See Ross Ker-
ber, The Momentum Builds for Online-Only Annual Meetings, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22,
2002, at C1.
415. Delaware law and the Model Business Corporation Act have already been changed
to permit broader use of e-mail as a method of communicating with shareholders. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (2002). For a comparison of
the two approaches, see Michael P. Dooley and Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons
Between the Model Business Corporation Act And the Delaware General Corporation Law,
56 Bus. LAw. 737 (2001).
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